Structural Realism after the Cold War
Author(s): Kenneth N. Waltz
Source: *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer, 2000), pp. 5-41
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626772
Accessed: 27/08/2008 03:12

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

http://www.jstor.org

Structural Realism after the Cold War

Kenneth N. Waltz

Some students of international politics believe that realism is obsolete.[1] They argue that, although realism's concepts of anarchy, self-help, and power balancing may have been appropriate to a bygone era, they have been displaced by changed conditions and eclipsed by better ideas. New times call for new thinking. Changing conditions require revised theories or entirely different ones.

True, if the conditions that a theory contemplated have changed, the theory no longer applies. But what sorts of changes would alter the international political system so profoundly that old ways of thinking would no longer be relevant? Changes *of* the system would do it; changes *in* the system would not. Within-system changes take place all the time, some important, some not. Big changes in the means of transportation, communication, and war fighting, for example, strongly affect how states and other agents interact. Such changes occur at the unit level. In modern history, or perhaps in all of history, the introduction of nuclear weaponry was the greatest of such changes. Yet in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly for others' security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system.

Changes in the structure of the system are distinct from changes at the unit level. Thus, changes in polarity also affect how states provide for their security. Significant changes take place when the number of great powers reduces to two or one. With more than two, states rely for their security both on their

Kenneth N. Waltz, former Ford Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is a Research Associate of the Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor at Columbia University.

I am indebted to Karen Adams and Robert Rauchhaus for help on this article from its conception to its completion. For insightful and constructive criticisms I wish to thank Robert Art, Richard Betts, Barbara Farnham, Anne Fox, Robert Jervis, Warner Schilling, and Mark Sheetz.

1. For example, Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 249–277; Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 5–55; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 108–148; and John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899–912.

International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5–41
© 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

own internal efforts and on alliances they may make with others. Competition in multipolar systems is more complicated than competition in bipolar ones because uncertainties about the comparative capabilities of states multiply as numbers grow, and because estimates of the cohesiveness and strength of coalitions are hard to make.

Both changes of weaponry and changes of polarity were big ones with ramifications that spread through the system, yet they did not transform it. If the system were transformed, international politics would no longer be international politics, and the past would no longer serve as a guide to the future. We would begin to call international politics by another name, as some do. The terms "world politics" or "global politics," for example, suggest that politics among self-interested states concerned with their security has been replaced by some other kind of politics or perhaps by no politics at all.

What changes, one may wonder, would turn international politics into something distinctly different? The answer commonly given is that international politics is being transformed and realism is being rendered obsolete as democracy extends its sway, as interdependence tightens its grip, and as institutions smooth the way to peace. I consider these points in successive sections. A fourth section explains why realist theory retains its explanatory power after the Cold War.

Democracy and Peace

The end of the Cold War coincided with what many took to be a new democratic wave. The trend toward democracy combined with Michael Doyle's rediscovery of the peaceful behavior of liberal democratic states *inter se* contributes strongly to the belief that war is obsolescent, if not obsolete, among the advanced industrial states of the world.[2]

The democratic peace thesis holds that democracies do not fight democracies. Notice that I say "thesis," not "theory." The belief that democracies constitute a zone of peace rests on a perceived high correlation between governmental form and international outcome. Francis Fukuyama thinks that the correlation is perfect: Never once has a democracy fought another democracy. Jack Levy says that it is "the closest thing we have to an empirical law

2. Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts 1 and 2," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, Nos. 3 and 4 (Summer and Fall 1983); and Doyle, "Kant: Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151–1169.

in the study of international relations."[3] But, if it is true that democracies rest reliably at peace among themselves, we have not a theory but a purported fact begging for an explanation, as facts do. The explanation given generally runs this way: Democracies of the right kind (i.e., liberal ones) are peaceful in relation to one another. This was Immanuel Kant's point. The term he used was *Rechtsstaat* or republic, and his definition of a republic was so restrictive that it was hard to believe that even one of them could come into existence, let alone two or more.[4] And if they did, who can say that they would continue to be of the right sort or continue to be democracies at all? The short and sad life of the Weimar Republic is a reminder. And how does one define what the right sort of democracy is? Some American scholars thought that Wilhelmine Germany was the very model of a modern democratic state with a wide suffrage, honest elections, a legislature that controlled the purse, competitive parties, a free press, and a highly competent bureaucracy.[5] But in the French, British, and American view after August of 1914, Germany turned out not to be a democracy of the right kind. John Owen tried to finesse the problem of definition by arguing that democracies that perceive one another to be liberal democracies will not fight.[6] That rather gives the game away. Liberal democracies have at times prepared for wars against other liberal democracies and have sometimes come close to fighting them. Christopher Layne shows that some wars between democracies were averted not because of the reluctance of democracies to fight each other but for fear of a third party—a good realist reason. How, for example, could Britain and France fight each other over Fashoda in 1898 when Germany lurked in the background? In emphasizing the international political reasons for democracies not fighting each other, Layne gets to the heart of the matter.[7] Conformity of countries to a prescribed

---

3. Francis Fukuyama, "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon," *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1991), p. 662. Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 88.
4. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (June 1962). Subsequent Kant references are found in this work.
5. Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 157ff.; Christopher Layne, in the second half of Layne and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, *Should America Spread Democracy? A Debate* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming), argues convincingly that Germany's democratic control of foreign and military policy was no weaker than France's or Britain's.
6. John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87–125. Cf. his *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
7. Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5–49.

political form may eliminate some of the causes of war; it cannot eliminate all of them. The democratic peace thesis will hold only if all of the causes of war lie inside of states.

THE CAUSES OF WAR

To explain war is easier than to understand the conditions of peace. If one asks what may cause war, the simple answer is "anything." That is Kant's answer: The natural state is the state of war. Under the conditions of international politics, war recurs; the sure way to abolish war, then, is to abolish international politics.

Over the centuries, liberals have shown a strong desire to get the politics out of politics. The ideal of nineteenth-century liberals was the police state, that is, the state that would confine its activities to catching criminals and enforcing contracts. The ideal of the laissez-faire state finds many counterparts among students of international politics with their yen to get the power out of power politics, the national out of international politics, the dependence out of interdependence, the relative out of relative gains, the politics out of international politics, and the structure out of structural theory.

Proponents of the democratic peace thesis write as though the spread of democracy will negate the effects of anarchy. No causes of conflict and war will any longer be found at the structural level. Francis Fukuyama finds it "perfectly possible to imagine anarchic state systems that are nonetheless peaceful." He sees no reason to associate anarchy with war. Bruce Russett believes that, with enough democracies in the world, it "may be possible in part to supersede the 'realist' principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice . . . since at least the seventeenth century."[8] Thus the structure is removed from structural theory. Democratic states would be so confident of the peace-preserving effects of democracy that they would no longer fear that another state, so long as it remained democratic, would do it wrong. The guarantee of the state's proper external behavior would derive from its admirable internal qualities.

This is a conclusion that Kant would not sustain. German historians at the turn of the nineteenth century wondered whether peacefully inclined states could be planted and expected to grow where dangers from outside pressed daily upon them.[9] Kant a century earlier entertained the same worry. The

8. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. 254–256. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 24.

9. For example, Leopold von Ranke, Gerhard Ritter, and Otto Hintze. The American William Graham Sumner and many others shared their doubts.

seventh proposition of his "Principles of the Political Order" avers that establishment of the proper constitution internally requires the proper ordering of the external relations of states. The first duty of the state is to defend itself, and outside of a juridical order none but the state itself can define the actions required. "Lesion of a less powerful country," Kant writes, "may be involved merely in the condition of a more powerful neighbor prior to any action at all; and in the State of Nature an attack under such circumstances would be warrantable."[10] In the state of nature, there is no such thing as an unjust war.

Every student of international politics is aware of the statistical data supporting the democratic peace thesis. Everyone has also known at least since David Hume that we have no reason to believe that the association of events provides a basis for inferring the presence of a causal relation. John Mueller properly speculates that it is not democracy that causes peace but that other conditions cause both democracy and peace.[11] Some of the major democracies—Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century—have been among the most powerful states of their eras. Powerful states often gain their ends by peaceful means where weaker states either fail or have to resort to war.[12] Thus, the American government deemed the democratically elected Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic too weak to bring order to his country. The United States toppled his government by sending 23,000 troops within a week, troops whose mere presence made fighting a war unnecessary. Salvador Allende, democratically elected ruler of Chile, was systematically and effectively undermined by the United States, without the open use of force, because its leaders thought that his government was taking a wrong turn. As Henry Kissinger put it: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."[13] That is the way it is with democracies—their people may show bad judgment. "Wayward" democracies are especially tempting objects of intervention by other democracies that wish to save them. American policy may have been wise in both cases, but its actions surely cast doubt on the democratic peace thesis. So do the instances when a democracy did fight another democ-

10. Immanuel Kant, *The Philosophy of Law*, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1887), p. 218.
11. John Mueller, "Is War Still Becoming Obsolete?" paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August–September 1991, pp. 55ff; cf. his *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995).
12. Edward Hallett Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 2d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1946), pp. 129–132.
13. Quoted in Anthony Lewis, "The Kissinger Doctrine," *New York Times*, February 27, 1975, p. 35; and see Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), chap. 17.

racy.[14] So do the instances in which democratically elected legislatures have clamored for war, as has happened for example in Pakistan and Jordan.

One can of course say, yes, but the Dominican Republic and Chile were not liberal democracies nor perceived as such by the United States. Once one begins to go down that road, there is no place to stop. The problem is heightened because liberal democracies, as they prepare for a war they may fear, begin to look less liberal and will look less liberal still if they begin to fight one. I am tempted to say that the democratic peace thesis in the form in which its proponents cast it is irrefutable. A liberal democracy at war with another country is unlikely to call it a liberal democracy.

Democracies may live at peace with democracies, but even if all states became democratic, the structure of international politics would remain anarchic. The structure of international politics is not transformed by changes internal to states, however widespread the changes may be. In the absence of an external authority, a state cannot be sure that today's friend will not be tomorrow's enemy. Indeed, democracies have at times behaved as though today's democracy is today's enemy and a present threat to them. In Federalist Paper number six, Alexander Hamilton asked whether the thirteen states of the Confederacy might live peacefully with one another as freely constituted republics. He answered that there have been "almost as many popular as royal wars." He cited the many wars fought by republican Sparta, Athens, Rome, Carthage, Venice, Holland, and Britain. John Quincy Adams, in response to James Monroe's contrary claim, averred "that the government of a Republic was as capable of intriguing with the leaders of a free people as neighboring monarchs."[15] In the latter half of the nineteenth century, as the United States and Britain became more democratic, bitterness grew between them, and the possibility of war was at times seriously entertained on both sides of the Atlantic. France and Britain were among the principal adversaries in the great power politics of the nineteenth century, as they were earlier. Their becoming democracies did not change their behavior toward each other. In 1914, democratic England and France fought democratic Germany, and doubts about the latter's democratic standing merely illustrate the problem of definition. Indeed, the democratic pluralism of Germany was an underlying cause of the war. In response to domestic interests, Germany followed

14. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, "America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1991); and Mueller, "Is War Still Becoming Obsolete?" p. 5.
15. Quoted in Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), p. 28 and n. 36.

policies bound to frighten both Britain and Russia. And today if a war that a few have feared were fought by the United States and Japan, many Americans would say that Japan was not a democracy after all, but merely a one-party state.

What can we conclude? Democracies rarely fight democracies, we might say, and then add as a word of essential caution that the internal excellence of states is a brittle basis of peace.

DEMOCRATIC WARS

Democracies coexist with undemocratic states. Although democracies seldom fight democracies, they do, as Michael Doyle has noted, fight at least their share of wars against others.[16] Citizens of democratic states tend to think of their countries as good, aside from what they do, simply because they are democratic. Thus former Secretary of State Warren Christopher claimed that "democratic nations rarely start wars or threaten their neighbors."[17] One might suggest that he try his proposition out in Central or South America. Citizens of democratic states also tend to think of undemocratic states as bad, aside from what they do, simply because they are undemocratic. Democracies promote war because they at times decide that the way to preserve peace is to defeat nondemocratic states and make them democratic.

During World War I, Walter Hines Page, American ambassador to England, claimed that there "is no security in any part of the world where people cannot think of a government without a king and never will be." During the Vietnam War, Secretary of State Dean Rusk claimed that the "United States cannot be secure until the total international environment is ideologically safe."[18] Policies aside, the very existence of undemocratic states is a danger to others. American political and intellectual leaders have often taken this view. Liberal interventionism is again on the march. President Bill Clinton and his national security adviser, Anthony Lake, urged the United States to take measures to enhance democracy around the world. The task, one fears, will be taken up by the American military with some enthusiasm. Former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan, for example, favored a new military "model," replacing the negative aim of containment with a positive one: "To promote democracy,

---

16. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2," p. 337.
17. Warren Christopher, "The U.S.-Japan Relationship: The Responsibility to Change," address to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, Tokyo, Japan, March 11, 1994 (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication), p. 3.
18. Page quoted in Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 121. Rusk quoted in Layne, "Kant or Cant," p. 46.

regional stability, and economic prosperity."[19] Other voices urge us to enter into a "struggle to ensure that people are governed well." Having apparently solved the problem of justice at home, "the struggle for liberal government becomes a struggle not simply for justice but for survival."[20] As R.H. Tawney said: "Either war is a crusade, or it is a crime."[21] Crusades are frightening because crusaders go to war for righteous causes, which they define for themselves and try to impose on others. One might have hoped that Americans would have learned that they are not very good at causing democracy abroad. But, alas, if the world can be made safe for democracy only by making it democratic, then all means are permitted and to use them becomes a duty. The war fervor of people and their representatives is at times hard to contain. Thus Hans Morgenthau believed that "the democratic selection and responsibility of government officials destroyed international morality as an effective system of restraint."[22]

Since, as Kant believed, war among self-directed states will occasionally break out, peace has to be contrived. For any government, doing so is a difficult task, and all states are at times deficient in accomplishing it, even if they wish to. Democratic leaders may respond to the fervor for war that their citizens sometimes display, or even try to arouse it, and governments are sometimes constrained by electoral calculations to defer preventive measures. Thus British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin said that if he had called in 1935 for British rearmament against the German threat, his party would have lost the next election.[23] Democratic governments may respond to internal political imperatives when they should be responding to external ones. All governments have their faults, democracies no doubt fewer than others, but that is not good enough to sustain the democratic peace thesis.

That peace may prevail among democratic states is a comforting thought. The obverse of the proposition—that democracy may promote war against undemocratic states—is disturbing. If the latter holds, we cannot even say for sure that the spread of democracy will bring a net decrease in the amount of war in the world.

---

19. Quoted in Clemson G. Turregano and Ricky Lynn Waddell, "From Paradigm to Paradigm Shift: The Military and Operations Other than War," *Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 22 (1994), p. 15.
20. Peter Beinart, "The Return of the Bomb," *New Republic*, August 3, 1998, p. 27.
21. Quoted in Michael Straight, *Make This the Last War* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), p. 1.
22. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973), p. 248.
23. Gordon Craig and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 64.

With a republic established in a strong state, Kant hoped the republican form would gradually take hold in the world. In 1795, America provided the hope. Two hundred years later, remarkably, it still does. Ever since liberals first expressed their views, they have been divided. Some have urged liberal states to work to uplift benighted peoples and bring the benefits of liberty, justice, and prosperity to them. John Stuart Mill, Giuseppe Mazzini, Woodrow Wilson, and Bill Clinton are all interventionist liberals. Other liberals, Kant and Richard Cobden, for example, while agreeing on the benefits that democracy can bring to the world, have emphasized the difficulties and the dangers of actively seeking its propagation.

If the world is now safe for democracy, one has to wonder whether democracy is safe for the world. When democracy is ascendant, a condition that in the twentieth century attended the winning of hot wars and cold ones, the interventionist spirit flourishes. The effect is heightened when one democratic state becomes dominant, as the United States is now. Peace is the noblest cause of war. If the conditions of peace are lacking, then the country with a capability of creating them may be tempted to do so, whether or not by force. The end is noble, but as a matter of *right*, Kant insists, no state can intervene in the internal arrangements of another. As a matter of *fact*, one may notice that intervention, even for worthy ends, often brings more harm than good. The vice to which great powers easily succumb in a multipolar world is inattention; in a bipolar world, overreaction; in a unipolar world, overextention.

Peace is maintained by a delicate balance of internal and external restraints. States having a surplus of power are tempted to use it, and weaker states fear their doing so. The laws of voluntary federations, to use Kant's language, are disregarded at the whim of the stronger, as the United States demonstrated a decade ago by mining Nicaraguan waters and by invading Panama. In both cases, the United States blatantly violated international law. In the first, it denied the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which it had previously accepted. In the second, it flaunted the law embodied in the Charter of the Organization of American States, of which it was a principal sponsor.

If the democratic peace thesis is right, structural realist theory is wrong. One may believe, with Kant, that republics are by and large good states *and* that unbalanced power is a danger no matter who wields it. Inside of, as well as outside of, the circle of democratic states, peace depends on a precarious balance of forces. The causes of war lie not simply in states or in the state system; they are found in both. Kant understood this. Devotees of the democratic peace thesis overlook it.

The Weak Effects of Interdependence

If not democracy alone, may not the spread of democracy combined with the tightening of national interdependence fulfill the prescription for peace offered by nineteenth-century liberals and so often repeated today?[24] To the supposedly peaceful inclination of democracies, interdependence adds the propulsive power of the profit motive. Democratic states may increasingly devote themselves to the pursuit of peace and profits. The trading state is replacing the political-military state, and the power of the market now rivals or surpasses the power of the state, or so some believe.[25]

Before World War I, Norman Angell believed that wars would not be fought because they would not pay, yet Germany and Britain, each other's second-best customers, fought a long and bloody war.[26] Interdependence in some ways promotes peace by multiplying contacts among states and contributing to mutual understanding. It also multiplies the occasions for conflicts that may promote resentment and even war.[27] Close interdependence is a condition in which one party can scarcely move without jostling others; a small push ripples through society. The closer the social bonds, the more extreme the effect becomes, and one cannot sensibly pursue an interest without taking others' interests into account. One country is then inclined to treat another country's acts as events within its own polity and to attempt to control them.

That interdependence promotes war as well as peace has been said often enough. What requires emphasis is that, either way, among the forces that shape international politics, interdependence is a weak one. Interdependence within modern states is much closer than it is across states. The Soviet economy was planned so that its far-flung parts would be not just interdependent but integrated. Huge factories depended for their output on products exchanged

---

24. Strongly affirmative answers are given by John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1999), pp. 423–442; and Russett, Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950–85," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 441–467.

25. Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Coalitions in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and at times Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

26. Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 4th rev. and enlarged ed. (New York: Putnam's, 1913).

27. Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 1996). Lawrence Keely, *War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 196, shows that with increases of trade and intermarriage among tribes, war became more frequent.

with others. Despite the tight integration of the Soviet economy, the state fell apart. Yugoslavia provides another stark illustration. Once external political pressure lessened, internal economic interests were too weak to hold the country together. One must wonder whether economic interdependence is more effect than cause. Internally, interdependence becomes so close that integration is the proper word to describe it. Interdependence becomes integration because internally the expectation that peace will prevail and order will be preserved is high. Externally, goods and capital flow freely where peace among countries appears to be reliably established. Interdependence, like integration, depends on other conditions. It is more a dependent than an independent variable. States, if they can afford to, shy away from becoming excessively dependent on goods and resources that may be denied them in crises and wars. States take measures, such as Japan's managed trade, to avoid excessive dependence on others.[28]

The impulse to protect one's identity—cultural and political as well as economic—from encroachment by others is strong. When it seems that "we will sink or swim together," swimming separately looks attractive to those able to do it. From Plato onward, utopias were set in isolation from neighbors so that people could construct their collective life uncontaminated by contact with others. With zero interdependence, neither conflict nor war is possible. With integration, international becomes national politics.[29] The zone in between is a gray one with the effects of interdependence sometimes good, providing the benefits of divided labor, mutual understanding, and cultural enrichment, and sometimes bad, leading to protectionism, mutual resentment, conflict, and war.

The uneven effects of interdependence, with some parties to it gaining more, others gaining less, are obscured by the substitution of Robert Keohane's and Joseph Nye's term "asymmetric interdependence" for relations of dependence and independence among states.[30] Relatively independent states are in a stronger position than relatively dependent ones. If I depend more on you than you depend on me, you have more ways of influencing me and affecting my

28. On states managing interdependence to avoid excessive dependence, see especially Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), chap. 10; and Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., *National Diversity and Global Capitalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).

29. Cf. Kenneth N. Waltz, in Steven L. Spiegel and Waltz, eds., *Conflict in World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1971), chap. 13.

30. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2d ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1989).

fate than I have of affecting yours. Interdependence suggests a condition of roughly equal dependence of parties on one another. Omitting the word "dependence" blunts the inequalities that mark the relations of states and makes them all seem to be on the same footing. Much of international, as of national, politics is about inequalities. Separating one "issue area" from others and emphasizing that weak states have advantages in some of them reduces the sense of inequality. Emphasizing the low fungibility of power furthers the effect. If power is not very fungible, weak states may have decisive advantages on some issues. Again, the effects of inequality are blunted. But power, not very fungible for weak states, is very fungible for strong ones. The history of American foreign policy since World War II is replete with examples of how the United States used its superior economic capability to promote its political and security interests.[31]

In a 1970 essay, I described interdependence as an ideology used by Americans to camouflage the great leverage the United States enjoys in international politics by making it seem that strong and weak, rich and poor nations are similarly entangled in a thick web of interdependence.[32] In her recent book, *The Retreat of the State*, Susan Strange reached the same conclusion, but by an odd route. Her argument is that "the progressive integration of the world economy, through international production, has shifted the balance of power away from states and toward world markets." She advances three propositions in support of her argument: (1) power has "shifted upward from weak states to stronger ones" having global or regional reach; (2) power has "shifted sideways from states to markets and thus to non-state authorities deriving power from their market shares"; and (3) some power has "evaporated" with no one exercising it.[33] In international politics, with no central authority, power does sometimes slip away and sometimes move sideways to markets. When serious slippage occurs, however, stronger states step in to reverse it, and firms of the stronger states control the largest market shares anyway. One may doubt whether markets any more escape the control of major states now than they

31. Keohane and Nye are on both sides of the issue. See, for example, ibid., p. 28. Keohane emphasized that power is not very fungible in Keohane, ed., "Theory of World Politics," *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); and see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflection on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in ibid. Robert J. Art analyzes the fungibility of power in detail. See Art, "American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996).
32. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence," in Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970).
33. Strange, *Retreat of the State*, pp. 46, 189.

did in the nineteenth century or earlier—perhaps less so since the competence of states has increased at least in proportion to increases in the size and complications of markets. Anyone, realist or not, might think Strange's first proposition is the important one. Never since the Roman Empire has power been so concentrated in one state. Despite believing that power has moved from states to markets, Strange recognized reality. She observed near the beginning of her book that the "authority—the 'power over' global outcomes enjoyed by American society, and therefore indirectly by the United States government—is still superior to that of any other society or any other government." And near the end, she remarked that the "authority of governments tends to over-rule the caution of markets." If one wondered which government she had in mind, she answered immediately: "The fate of Mexico is decided in Washington more than Wall Street. And the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is obliged to follow the American lead, despite the misgivings of Germany or Japan."[34]

The history of the past two centuries has been one of central governments acquiring more and more power. Alexis de Tocqueville observed during his visit to the United States in 1831 that "the Federal Government scarcely ever interferes in any but foreign affairs; and the governments of the states in reality direct society in America."[35] After World War II, governments in Western Europe disposed of about a quarter of their peoples' income. The proportion now is more than half. At a time when Americans, Britons, Russians, and Chinese were decrying the control of the state over their lives, it was puzzling to be told that states were losing control over their external affairs. Losing control, one wonders, as compared to when? Weak states have lost some of their influence and control over external matters, but strong states have not lost theirs. The patterns are hardly new ones. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the strongest state with the longest reach intervened all over the globe and built history's most extensive empire. In the twentieth century, the strongest state with the longest reach repeated Britain's interventionist behavior and, since the end of the Cold War, on an ever widening scale, without building an empire. The absence of empire hardly means, however, that the extent of America's influence and control over the actions of others is of lesser moment. The withering away of the power of the state, whether inter-

34. Ibid., pp. 25, 192.
35. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J.P. Mayer, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Harper Perennial, 1988), p. 446, n. 1.

nally or externally, is more of a wish and an illusion than a reality in most of the world.

Under the Pax Britannica, the interdependence of states became unusually close, which to many portended a peaceful and prosperous future. Instead, a prolonged period of war, autarky, and more war followed. The international economic system, constructed under American auspices after World War II and later amended to suit its purposes, may last longer, but then again it may not. The character of international politics changes as national interdependence tightens or loosens. Yet even as relations vary, states have to take care of themselves as best they can in an anarchic environment. Internationally, the twentieth century for the most part was an unhappy one. In its last quarter, the clouds lifted a little, but twenty-five years is a slight base on which to ground optimistic conclusions. Not only are the effects of close interdependence problematic, but so also is its durability.

The Limited Role of International Institutions

One of the charges hurled at realist theory is that it depreciates the importance of institutions. The charge is justified, and the strange case of NATO's (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's) outliving its purpose shows why realists believe that international institutions are shaped and limited by the states that found and sustain them and have little independent effect. Liberal institutionalists paid scant attention to organizations designed to buttress the security of states until, contrary to expectations inferred from realist theories, NATO not only survived the end of the Cold War but went on to add new members and to promise to embrace still more. Far from invalidating realist theory or casting doubt on it, however, the recent history of NATO illustrates the subordination of international institutions to national purposes.

EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The nature and purposes of institutions change as structures vary. In the old multipolar world, the core of an alliance consisted of a small number of states of comparable capability. Their contributions to one another's security were of crucial importance because they were of similar size. Because major allies were closely interdependent militarily, the defection of one would have made its partners vulnerable to a competing alliance. The members of opposing alliances before World War I were tightly knit because of their mutual dependence. In the new bipolar world, the word "alliance" took on a different meaning. One country, the United States or the Soviet Union, provided most of the

security for its bloc. The withdrawal of France from NATO's command structure and the defection of China from the Soviet bloc failed even to tilt the central balance. Early in the Cold War, Americans spoke with alarm about the threat of monolithic communism arising from the combined strength of the Soviet Union and China, yet the bloc's disintegration caused scarcely a ripple. American officials did not proclaim that with China's defection, America's defense budget could safely be reduced by 20 or 10 percent or even be reduced at all. Similarly, when France stopped playing its part in NATO's military plans, American officials did not proclaim that defense spending had to be increased for that reason. Properly speaking, NATO and the WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization) were treaties of guarantee rather than old-style military alliances.[36]

Glenn Snyder has remarked that "alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response."[37] I expected NATO to dwindle at the Cold War's end and ultimately to disappear.[38] In a basic sense, the expectation has been borne out. NATO is no longer even a treaty of guarantee because one cannot answer the question, guarantee against whom? Functions vary as structures change, as does the behavior of units. Thus the end of the Cold War quickly changed the behavior of allied countries. In early July of 1990, NATO announced that the alliance would "elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe."[39] By the end of July, without waiting for any such plans, the major European members of NATO unilaterally announced large reductions in their force levels. Even the pretense of continuing to act as an alliance in setting military policy disappeared.

With its old purpose dead, and the individual and collective behavior of its members altered accordingly, how does one explain NATO's survival and expansion? Institutions are hard to create and set in motion, but once created, institutionalists claim, they may take on something of a life of their own; they may begin to act with a measure of autonomy, becoming less dependent on the wills of their sponsors and members. NATO supposedly validates these thoughts.

Organizations, especially big ones with strong traditions, have long lives. The March of Dimes is an example sometimes cited. Having won the war

---

36. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1967), p. 219.
37. Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 192.
38. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 75–76.
39. John Roper, "Shaping Strategy without the Threat," Adephi Paper No. 257 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1990/91), pp. 80–81.

against polio, its mission was accomplished. Nevertheless, it cast about for a new malady to cure or contain. Even though the most appealing ones—cancer, diseases of the heart and lungs, multiple sclerosis, and cystic fibrosis—were already taken, it did find a worthy cause to pursue, the amelioration of birth defects. One can fairly claim that the March of Dimes enjoys continuity as an organization, pursuing an end consonant with its original purpose. How can one make such a claim for NATO?

The question of purpose may not be a very important one; create an organization and it will find something to do.[40] Once created, and the more so once it has become well established, an organization becomes hard to get rid of. A big organization is managed by large numbers of bureaucrats who develop a strong interest in its perpetuation. According to Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, in 1993 NATO headquarters was manned by 2,640 officials, most of whom presumably wanted to keep their jobs.[41] The durability of NATO even as the structure of international politics has changed, and the old purpose of the organization has disappeared, is interpreted by institutionalists as evidence strongly arguing for the autonomy and vitality of institutions.

The institutionalist interpretation misses the point. NATO is first of all a treaty made by states. A deeply entrenched international bureaucracy can help to sustain the organization, but states determine its fate. Liberal institutionalists take NATO's seeming vigor as confirmation of the importance of international institutions and as evidence of their resilience. Realists, noticing that as an alliance NATO has lost its major function, see it mainly as a means of maintaining and lengthening America's grip on the foreign and military policies of European states. John Kornblum, U.S. senior deputy to the undersecretary of state for European affairs, neatly described NATO's new role. "The Alliance," he wrote, "provides a vehicle for the application of American power and vision to the security order in Europe."[42] The survival and expansion of NATO tell us much about American power and influence and little about institutions as multilateral entities. The ability of the United States to extend the life of a moribund institution nicely illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests.

---

40. Joseph A. Schumpeter, writing of armies, put it this way: "*created by wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required.*" "The Sociology of Imperialism," in Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), p. 25 (emphasis in original).
41. Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," *Security Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), p. 20.
42. John Kornblum, "NATO's Second Half Century—Tasks for an Alliance," *NATO on Track for the 21st Century*, Conference Report (The Hague: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1994), p. 14.

The Bush administration saw, and the Clinton administration continued to see, NATO as the instrument for maintaining America's domination of the foreign and military policies of European states. In 1991, U.S. Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew's letter to the governments of European members of NATO warned against Europe's formulating independent positions on defense. France and Germany had thought that a European security and defense identity might be developed within the EU and that the Western European Union, formed in 1954, could be revived as the instrument for its realization. The Bush administration quickly squelched these ideas. The day after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in December of 1991, President George Bush could say with satisfaction that "we are pleased that our Allies in the Western European Union . . . decided to strengthen that institution as both NATO's European pillar and the defense component of the European Union."[43]

The European pillar was to be contained within NATO, and its policies were to be made in Washington. Weaker states have trouble fashioning institutions to serve their own ends in their own ways, especially in the security realm. Think of the defeat of the European Defense Community in 1954, despite America's support of it, and the inability of the Western European Union in the more than four decades of its existence to find a significant role independent of the United States. Realism reveals what liberal institutionalist "theory" obscures: namely, that international institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests.[44] Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, replying to John Mearsheimer's criticism of liberal institutionalism, ask: How are we "to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions if such institutions are lacking in significance?"[45] If the answer were not already obvious, the expansion of NATO would make it so: to serve what powerful states believe to be their interests.

With the administration's Bosnian policy in trouble, Clinton needed to show himself an effective foreign policy leader. With the national heroes Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel clamoring for their countries' inclusion, foreclosing NATO membership would have handed another issue to the Republican Party in the

---

43. Mark S. Sheetz, "Correspondence: Debating the Unipolar Moment," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 170; and Mike Winnerstig, "Rethinking Alliance Dynamics," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., March 18–22, 1997, at p. 23.

44. Cf. Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

45. Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 40.

congressional elections of 1994. To tout NATO's eastward march, President Clinton gave major speeches in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Detroit, cities with significant numbers of East European voters.[46] Votes and dollars are the lifeblood of American politics. New members of NATO will be required to improve their military infrastructure and to buy modern weapons. The American arms industry, expecting to capture its usual large share of a new market, has lobbied heavily in favor of NATO's expansion.[47]

The reasons for expanding NATO are weak. The reasons for opposing expansion are strong.[48] It draws new lines of division in Europe, alienates those left out, and can find no logical stopping place west of Russia. It weakens those Russians most inclined toward liberal democracy and a market economy. It strengthens Russians of the opposite inclination. It reduces hope for further large reductions of nuclear weaponry. It pushes Russia toward China instead of drawing Russia toward Europe and America. NATO, led by America, scarcely considered the plight of its defeated adversary. Throughout modern history, Russia has been rebuffed by the West, isolated and at times surrounded. Many Russians believe that, by expanding, NATO brazenly broke promises it made in 1990 and 1991 that former WTO members would not be allowed to join NATO. With good reason, Russians fear that NATO will not only admit additional old members of the WTO but also former republics of the Soviet Union. In 1997, NATO held naval exercises with Ukraine in the Black Sea, with more joint exercises to come, and announced plans to use a military testing ground in western Ukraine. In June of 1998, Zbigniew Brzezinski went to Kiev with the message that Ukraine should prepare itself to join NATO by the year 2010.[49] The farther NATO intrudes into the Soviet Union's old arena, the more Russia is forced to look to the east rather than to the west.

The expansion of NATO extends its military interests, enlarges its responsibilities, and increases its burdens. Not only do new members require NATO's protection, they also heighten its concern over destabilizing events near their

---

46. James M. Goldgeier, "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 94–95. And see his *Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999).
47. William D. Hartung, "Welfare for Weapons Dealers 1998: The Hidden Costs of NATO Expansion" (New York: New School for Social Research, World Policy Institute, March 1998); and Jeff Gerth and Tim Weiner, "Arms Makers See Bonanza in Selling NATO Expansion," *New York Times*, June 29, 1997, p. I, 8.
48. See Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of Expansion," *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 34–52. Michael Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996). Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996).
49. J.L. Black, *Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms?* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 5–35, 175–201.

borders. Thus Balkan eruptions become a NATO and not just a European concern. In the absence of European initiative, Americans believe they must lead the way because the credibility of NATO is at stake. Balkan operations in the air and even more so on the ground exacerbate differences of interest among NATO members and strain the alliance. European members marvel at the surveillance and communications capabilities of the United States and stand in awe of the modern military forces at its command. Aware of their weaknesses, Europeans express determination to modernize their forces and to develop their ability to deploy them independently. Europe's reaction to America's Balkan operations duplicates its determination to remedy deficiencies revealed in 1991 during the Gulf War, a determination that produced few results.

Will it be different this time? Perhaps, yet if European states do achieve their goals of creating a 60,000 strong rapid reaction force and enlarging the role of the WEU, the tension between a NATO controlled by the United States and a NATO allowing for independent European action will again be bothersome. In any event, the prospect of militarily bogging down in the Balkans tests the alliance and may indefinitely delay its further expansion. Expansion buys trouble, and mounting troubles may bring expansion to a halt.

European conditions and Russian opposition work against the eastward extension of NATO. Pressing in the opposite direction is the momentum of American expansion. The momentum of expansion has often been hard to break, a thought borne out by the empires of Republican Rome, of Czarist Russia, and of Liberal Britain.

One is often reminded that the United States is not just the dominant power in the world but that it is a *liberal* dominant power. True, the motivations of the artificers of expansion—President Clinton, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, and others—were to nurture democracy in young, fragile, long-suffering countries. One may wonder, however, why this should be an American rather than a European task and why a military rather than a political-economic organization should be seen as the appropriate means for carrying it out. The task of building democracy is not a military one. The military security of new NATO members is not in jeopardy; their political development and economic well-being are. In 1997, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Franklin D. Kramer told the Czech defense ministry that it was spending too little on defense.[50] Yet investing in defense slows economic growth. By common calculation, defense spending stimulates economic growth

50. Ibid., p. 72.

about half as much as direct investment in the economy. In Eastern Europe, economic not military security is the problem and entering a military alliance compounds it.

Using the example of NATO to reflect on the relevance of realism after the Cold War leads to some important conclusions. The winner of the Cold War and the sole remaining great power has behaved as unchecked powers have usually done. In the absence of counterweights, a country's internal impulses prevail, whether fueled by liberal or by other urges. The error of realist predictions that the end of the Cold War would mean the end of NATO arose not from a failure of realist theory to comprehend international politics, but from an underestimation of America's folly. The survival and expansion of NATO illustrate not the defects but the limitations of structural explanations. Structures shape and shove; they do not determine the actions of states. A state that is stronger than any other can decide for itself whether to conform its policies to structural pressures and whether to avail itself of the opportunities that structural change offers, with little fear of adverse affects in the short run.

Do liberal institutionalists provide better leverage for explaining NATO's survival and expansion? According to Keohane and Martin, realists insist "that institutions have only marginal effects."[51] On the contrary, realists have noticed that whether institutions have strong or weak effects depends on what states intend. Strong states use institutions, as they interpret laws, in ways that suit them. Thus Susan Strange, in pondering the state's retreat, observes that "international organization is above all a tool of national government, an instrument for the pursuit of national interest by other means."[52]

Interestingly, Keohane and Martin, in their effort to refute Mearsheimer's trenchant criticism of institutional theory, in effect agree with him. Having claimed that his realism is "not well specified," they note that "institutional theory conceptualizes institutions both as independent and dependent variables."[53] Dependent on what?—on "the realities of power and interest." Institutions, it turns out, "make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities."[54] Yes! Liberal institutionalism, as Mearsheimer says, "is no longer a clear alternative to realism, but has, in fact, been swallowed up by it."[55] Indeed, it never was an alternative to realism. Institutionalist theory, as Keohane has

51. Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," pp. 42, 46.
52. Strange, *Retreat of the State*, p. xiv; and see pp. 192–193. Cf. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 107: "international government is, in effect, government by that state which supplies the power necessary for the purpose of governing."
53. Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," p. 46.
54. Ibid., p. 42.
55. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," p. 85.

stressed, has as its core structural realism, which Keohane and Nye sought "to broaden."[56] The institutional approach starts with structural theory, applies it to the origins and operations of institutions, and unsurprisingly ends with realist conclusions.

Alliances illustrate the weaknesses of institutionalism with special clarity. Institutional theory attributes to institutions causal effects that mostly originate within states. The case of NATO nicely illustrates this shortcoming. Keohane has remarked that "alliances are institutions, and both their durability and strength . . . may depend in part on their institutional characteristics."[57] In part, I suppose, but one must wonder in how large a part. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente were quite durable. They lasted not because of alliance institutions, there hardly being any, but because the core members of each alliance looked outward and saw a pressing threat to their security. Previous alliances did not lack institutions because states had failed to figure out how to construct bureaucracies. Previous alliances lacked institutions because in the absence of a hegemonic leader, balancing continued within as well as across alliances. NATO lasted as a military alliance as long as the Soviet Union appeared to be a direct threat to its members. It survives and expands now not because of its institutions but mainly because the United States wants it to.

NATO's survival also exposes an interesting aspect of balance-of-power theory. Robert Art has argued forcefully that without NATO and without American troops in Europe, European states will lapse into a "security competition" among themselves.[58] As he emphasizes, this is a realist expectation. In his view, preserving NATO, and maintaining America's leading role in it, are required in order to prevent a security competition that would promote conflict within, and impair the institutions of, the European Union. NATO now is an anomaly; the dampening of intra-alliance tension is the main task left, and it is a task not for the alliance but for its leader. The secondary task of an alliance, intra-alliance management, continues to be performed by the United States even though the primary task, defense against an external enemy, has disappeared. The point is worth pondering, but I need to say here only that it

---

56. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 251; cf. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," in Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics*, p. 193, where he describes his approach as a "modified structural research program."
57. Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), p. 15.
58. Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996).

further illustrates the dependence of international institutions on national decisions. Balancing among states is not inevitable. As in Europe, a hegemonic power may suppress it. As a high-level European diplomat put it, "it is not acceptable that the lead nation be European. A European power broker is a hegemonic power. We can agree on U.S. leadership, but not on one of our own."[59] Accepting the leadership of a hegemonic power prevents a balance of power from emerging in Europe, and better the hegemonic power should be at a distance than next door.

Keohane believes that "avoiding military conflict in Europe after the Cold War depends greatly on whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous pattern of institutionalized cooperation."[60] If one accepts the conclusion, the question remains: What or who sustains the "pattern of institutionalized cooperation"? Realists know the answer.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND NATIONAL AIMS

What is true of NATO holds for international institutions generally. The effects that international institutions may have on national decisions are but one step removed from the capabilities and intentions of the major state or states that gave them birth and sustain them. The Bretton Woods system strongly affected individual states and the conduct of international affairs. But when the United States found that the system no longer served its interests, the Nixon shocks of 1971 were administered. International institutions are created by the more powerful states, and the institutions survive in their original form as long as they serve the major interests of their creators, or are thought to do so. "The nature of institutional arrangements," as Stephen Krasner put it, "is better explained by the distribution of national power capabilities than by efforts to solve problems of market failure"[61]—or, I would add, by anything else.

Either international conventions, treaties, and institutions remain close to the underlying distribution of national capabilities or they court failure.[62] Citing examples from the past 350 years, Krasner found that in all of the instances "it was the value of strong states that dictated rules that were applied in a

59. Quoted in ibid., p. 36.
60. Robert O. Keohane, "The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies," in Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., *America and Europe in an Era of Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), p. 53.
61. Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (April 1991), p. 234.
62. Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California, 1985), p. 263 and passim.

discriminating fashion only to the weak."[63] The sovereignty of nations, a universally recognized international institution, hardly stands in the way of a strong nation that decides to intervene in a weak one. Thus, according to a senior official, the Reagan administration "debated whether we had the right to dictate the form of another country's government. The bottom line was yes, that some rights are more fundamental than the right of nations to nonintervention. . . . We don't have the right to subvert a democracy but we do have the right against an undemocratic one."[64] Most international law is obeyed most of the time, but strong states bend or break laws when they choose to.

Balancing Power: Not Today but Tomorrow

With so many of the expectations that realist theory gives rise to confirmed by what happened at and after the end of the Cold War, one may wonder why realism is in bad repute.[65] A key proposition derived from realist theory is that international politics reflects the distribution of national capabilities, a proposition daily borne out. Another key proposition is that the balancing of power by some states against others recurs. Realist theory predicts that balances disrupted will one day be restored. A limitation of the theory, a limitation common to social science theories, is that it cannot say when. William Wohlforth argues that though restoration will take place, it will be a long time coming.[66] Of necessity, realist theory is better at saying what will happen than in saying when it will happen. Theory cannot say when "tomorrow" will come because international political theory deals with the pressures of structure on states and not with how states will respond to the pressures. The latter is a task for theories about how national governments respond to pressures on them and take advantage of opportunities that may be present. One does, however, observe balancing tendencies already taking place.

Upon the demise of the Soviet Union, the international political system became unipolar. In the light of structural theory, unipolarity appears as the least durable of international configurations. This is so for two main reasons.

---

63. Stephen D. Krasner, "International Political Economy: Abiding Discord," *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1994), p. 16.
64. Quoted in Robert Tucker, *Intervention and the Reagan Doctrine* (New York: Council on Religious and International Affairs, 1985), p. 5.
65. Robert Gilpin explains the oddity. See Gilpin, "No One Leaves a Political Realist," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 3–28.
66. William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5–41.

One is that dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their own borders, thus weakening themselves in the long run. Ted Robert Gurr, after examining 336 polities, reached the same conclusion that Robert Wesson had reached earlier: "Imperial decay is . . . primarily a result of the misuse of power which follows inevitably from its concentration."[67] The other reason for the short duration of unipolarity is that even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. America's founding fathers warned against the perils of power in the absence of checks and balances. Is unbalanced power less of a danger in international than in national politics? Throughout the Cold War, what the United States and the Soviet Union did, and how they interacted, were dominant factors in international politics. The two countries, however, constrained each other. Now the United States is alone in the world. As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power. Faced with unbalanced power, some states try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance. The reactions of other states to the drive for dominance of Charles V, Hapsburg ruler of Spain, of Louis XIV and Napoleon I of France, of Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler of Germany, illustrate the point.

THE BEHAVIOR OF DOMINANT POWERS

Will the preponderant power of the United States elicit similar reactions? Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others. The powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice, and well-being in the world. These terms, however, are defined to the liking of the powerful, which may conflict with the preferences and interests of others. In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it. With benign intent, the United States has behaved and, until its power is brought into balance, will continue to behave in ways that sometimes frighten others.

For almost half a century, the constancy of the Soviet threat produced a constancy of American policy. Other countries could rely on the United States for protection because protecting them seemed to serve American security interests. Even so, beginning in the 1950s, Western European countries and,

---

67. Quoted in Ted Robert Gurr, "Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68, No. 4 (December 1974), p. 1504, from Robert G. Wesson, *The Imperial Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), unpaginated preface. Cf. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).

beginning in the 1970s, Japan had increasing doubts about the reliability of the American nuclear deterrent. As Soviet strength increased, Western European countries began to wonder whether the United States could be counted on to use its deterrent on their behalf, thus risking its own cities. When President Jimmy Carter moved to reduce American troops in South Korea, and later when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and strengthened its forces in the Far East, Japan developed similar worries.

With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States no longer faces a major threat to its security. As General Colin Powell said when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung."[68] Constancy of threat produces constancy of policy; absence of threat permits policy to become capricious. When few if any vital interests are endangered, a country's policy becomes sporadic and self-willed.

The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices. A dominant power acts internationally only when the spirit moves it. One example is enough to show this. When Yugoslavia's collapse was followed by genocidal war in successor states, the United States failed to respond until Senator Robert Dole moved to make Bosnia's peril an issue in the forthcoming presidential election; and it acted not for the sake of its own security but to maintain its leadership position in Europe. American policy was generated not by external security interests, but by internal political pressure and national ambition.

Aside from specific threats it may pose, unbalanced power leaves weaker states feeling uneasy and gives them reason to strengthen their positions. The United States has a long history of intervening in weak states, often with the intention of bringing democracy to them. American behavior over the past century in Central America provides little evidence of self-restraint in the absence of countervailing power. Contemplating the history of the United States and measuring its capabilities, other countries may well wish for ways to fend off its benign ministrations. Concentrated power invites distrust because it is so easily misused. To understand why some states want to bring power into a semblance of balance is easy, but with power so sharply skewed, what country or group of countries has the material capability and the political will to bring the "unipolar moment" to an end?

---

68. "Cover Story: Communism's Collapse Poses a Challenge to America's Military," *U.S. News and World Report*, October 14, 1991, p. 28.

BALANCING POWER IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD

The expectation that following victory in a great war a new balance of power will form is firmly grounded in both history and theory. The last four grand coalitions (two against Napoleon and one in each of the world wars of the twentieth century) collapsed once victory was achieved. Victories in major wars leave the balance of power badly skewed. The winning side emerges as a dominant coalition. The international equilibrium is broken; theory leads one to expect its restoration.

Clearly something has changed. Some believe that the United States is so nice that, despite the dangers of unbalanced power, others do not feel the fear that would spur them to action. Michael Mastanduno, among others, believes this to be so, although he ends his article with the thought that "eventually, power will check power."[69] Others believe that the leaders of states have learned that playing the game of power politics is costly and unnecessary. In fact, the explanation for sluggish balancing is a simple one. In the aftermath of earlier great wars, the materials for constructing a new balance were readily at hand. Previous wars left a sufficient number of great powers standing to permit a new balance to be rather easily constructed. Theory enables one to say that a new balance of power will form but not to say how long it will take. National and international conditions determine that. Those who refer to the unipolar moment are right. In our perspective, the new balance is emerging slowly; in historical perspectives, it will come in the blink of an eye.

I ended a 1993 article this way: "One may hope that America's internal preoccupations will produce not an isolationist policy, which has become impossible, but a forbearance that will give other countries at long last the chance to deal with their own problems and make their own mistakes. But I would not bet on it."[70] I should think that few would do so now. Charles Kegley has said, sensibly, that if the world becomes multipolar once again, realists will be vindicated.[71] Seldom do signs of vindication appear so promptly.

The candidates for becoming the next great powers, and thus restoring a balance, are the European Union or Germany leading a coalition, China, Japan, and in a more distant future, Russia. The countries of the European Union have

69. Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), p. 88. See Josef Joffe's interesting analysis of America's role, '"Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995).
70. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," p. 79.
71. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 1993), p. 149.

been remarkably successful in integrating their national economies. The achievement of a large measure of economic integration without a corresponding political unity is an accomplishment without historical precedent. On questions of foreign and military policy, however, the European Union can act only with the consent of its members, making bold or risky action impossible. The European Union has all the tools—population, resources, technology, and military capabilities—but lacks the organizational ability and the collective will to use them. As Jacques Delors said when he was president of the European Commission: "It will be for the European Council, consisting of heads of state and government . . . , to agree on the essential interests they share and which they will agree to defend and promote together."[72] Policies that must be arrived at by consensus can be carried out only when they are fairly inconsequential. Inaction as Yugoslavia sank into chaos and war signaled that Europe will not act to stop wars even among near neighbors. Western Europe was unable to make its own foreign and military policies when its was an organization of six or nine states living in fear of the Soviet Union. With less pressure and more members, it has even less hope of doing so now. Only when the United States decides on a policy have European countries been able to follow it.

Europe may not remain in its supine position forever, yet signs of fundamental change in matters of foreign and military policy are faint. Now as earlier, European leaders express discontent with Europe's secondary position, chafe at America's making most of the important decisions, and show a desire to direct their own destiny. French leaders often vent their frustration and pine for a world, as Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine recently put it, "of several poles, not just a single one." President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin call for a strengthening of such multilateral institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations, although how this would diminish America's influence is not explained. More to the point, Védrine complains that since President John Kennedy, Americans have talked of a European pillar for the alliance, a pillar that is never built.[73] German and British leaders now more often express similar discontent. Europe, however, will not be able to claim a louder voice in alliance affairs unless it builds a platform for giving it expression. If Europeans ever mean to write a tune to go with their libretto, they will have to develop the unity in foreign and military affairs that they are achieving in economic matters. If French and

72. Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March/April 1991), p. 106.
73. Craig R. Whitney, "NATO at 50: With Nations at Odds, Is It a Misalliance?" *New York Times*, February 15, 1999, p. A1.

British leaders decided to merge their nuclear forces to form the nucleus of a European military organization, the United States and the world will begin to treat Europe as a major force.

The European Economic Community was formed in 1957 and has grown incrementally to its present proportions. But where is the incremental route to a European foreign and military policy to be found? European leaders have not been able to find it or even have tried very hard to do so. In the absence of radical change, Europe will count for little in international politics for as far ahead as the eye can see, unless Germany, becoming impatient, decides to lead a coalition.

INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE AND NATIONAL RESPONSES

Throughout modern history, international politics centered on Europe. Two world wars ended Europe's dominance. Whether Europe will somehow, someday emerge as a great power is a matter for speculation. In the meantime, the all-but-inevitable movement from unipolarity to multipolarity is taking place not in Europe but in Asia. The internal development and the external reaction of China and Japan are steadily raising both countries to the great power level.[74] China will emerge as a great power even without trying very hard so long as it remains politically united and competent. Strategically, China can easily raise its nuclear forces to a level of parity with the United States if it has not already done so.[75] China has five to seven intercontinental missiles (DF-5s) able to hit almost any American target and a dozen or more missiles able to reach the west coast of the United States (DF-4s).[76] Liquid fueled, immobile missiles are vulnerable, but would the United States risk the destruction of, say, Seattle, San Francisco, and San Diego if China happens to have a few more DF-4s than the United States thinks or if it should fail to destroy all of them on the ground? Deterrence is much easier to contrive than most Americans have surmised. Economically, China's growth rate, given its present stage of economic development, can be sustained at 7 to 9 percent for another decade or more. Even during Asia's near economic collapse of the 1990s, China's growth rate remained approximately in that range. A growth rate of 7 to 9 percent doubles a country's economy every ten to eight years.

---

74. The following four pages are adapted from Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics."

75. Nuclear parity is reached when countries have second-strike forces. It does not require quantitative or qualitative equality of forces. See Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 1990).

76. David E. Sanger and Erik Eckholm, "Will Beijing's Nuclear Arsenal Stay Small or Will It Mushroom?" *New York Times*, March 15, 1999, p. A1.

Unlike China, Japan is obviously reluctant to assume the mantle of a great power. Its reluctance, however, is steadily though slowly waning. Economically, Japan's power has grown and spread remarkably. The growth of a country's economic capability to the great power level places it at the center of regional and global affairs. It widens the range of a state's interests and increases their importance. The high volume of a country's external business thrusts it ever more deeply into world affairs. In a self-help system, the possession of most but not all of the capabilities of a great power leaves a state vulnerable to others that have the instruments that the lesser state lacks. Even though one may believe that fears of nuclear blackmail are misplaced, one must wonder whether Japan will remain immune to them.

Countries have always competed for wealth and security, and the competition has often led to conflict. Historically, states have been sensitive to changing relations of power among them. Japan is made uneasy now by the steady growth of China's military budget. Its nearly 3 million strong army, undergoing modernization, and the gradual growth of its sea- and air-power projection capabilities, produce apprehension in all of China's neighbors and add to the sense of instability in a region where issues of sovereignty and disputes over territory abound. The Korean peninsula has more military forces per square kilometer than any other portion of the globe. Taiwan is an unending source of tension. Disputes exist between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands, and between Japan and China over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands. Cambodia is a troublesome problem for both Vietnam and China. Half a dozen countries lay claim to all or some of the Spratly Islands, strategically located and supposedly rich in oil. The presence of China's ample nuclear forces, combined with the drawdown of American military forces, can hardly be ignored by Japan, the less so because economic conflicts with the United States cast doubt on the reliability of American military guarantees. Reminders of Japan's dependence and vulnerability multiply in large and small ways. For example, as rumors about North Korea's developing nuclear capabilities gained credence, Japan became acutely aware of its lack of observation satellites. Uncomfortable dependencies and perceived vulnerabilities have led Japan to acquire greater military capabilities, even though many Japanese may prefer not to.

Given the expectation of conflict, and the necessity of taking care of one's interests, one may wonder how any state with the economic capability of a great power can refrain from arming itself with the weapons that have served so well as the great deterrent. For a country to choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly. For that reason, the choice is a difficult one to sustain. Sooner or later, usually sooner, the international status of countries has

risen in step with their material resources. Countries with great power economies have become great powers, whether or not reluctantly. Some countries may strive to become great powers; others may wish to avoid doing so. The choice, however, is a constrained one. Because of the extent of their interests, larger units existing in a contentious arena tend to take on systemwide tasks. Profound change in a country's international situation produces radical change in its external behavior. After World War II, the United States broke with its centuries-long tradition of acting unilaterally and refusing to make long-term commitments. Japan's behavior in the past half century reflects the abrupt change in its international standing suffered because of its defeat in war. In the previous half century, after victory over China in 1894–95, Japan pressed for preeminence in Asia, if not beyond. Does Japan once again aspire to a larger role internationally? Its concerted regional activity, its seeking and gaining prominence in such bodies as the IMF and the World Bank, and its obvious pride in economic and technological achievements indicate that it does. The behavior of states responds more to external conditions than to internal habit if external change is profound.

When external conditions press firmly enough, they shape the behavior of states. Increasingly, Japan is being pressed to enlarge its conventional forces and to add nuclear ones to protect its interests. India, Pakistan, China, and perhaps North Korea have nuclear weapons capable of deterring others from threatening their vital interests. How long can Japan live alongside other nuclear states while denying itself similar capabilities? Conflicts and crises are certain to make Japan aware of the disadvantages of being without the military instruments that other powers command. Japanese nuclear inhibitions arising from World War II will not last indefinitely; one may expect them to expire as generational memories fade.

Japanese officials have indicated that when the protection of America's extended deterrent is no longer thought to be sufficiently reliable, Japan will equip itself with a nuclear force, whether or not openly. Japan has put itself politically and technologically in a position to do so. Consistently since the mid-1950s, the government has defined all of its Self-Defense Forces as conforming to constitutional requirements. Nuclear weapons purely for defense would be deemed constitutional should Japan decide to build some.[77] As a secret report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put it in 1969: "For the time

77. Norman D. Levin, "Japan's Defense Policy: The Internal Debate," in Harry H. Kendall and Clara Joewono, eds., *Japan, ASEAN, and the United States* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1990).

being, we will maintain the policy of not possessing nuclear weapons. However, regardless of joining the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] or not, we will keep the economic and technical potential for the production of nuclear weapons, while seeing to it that Japan will not be interfered with in this regard."[78] In March of 1988, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita called for a defensive capability matching Japan's economic power.[79] Only a balanced conventional-nuclear military capability would meet this requirement. In June of 1994, Prime Minister Tsutumu Hata mentioned in parliament that Japan had the ability to make nuclear weapons.[80]

Where some see Japan as a "global civilian power" and believe it likely to remain one, others see a country that has skillfully used the protection the United States has afforded and adroitly adopted the means of maintaining its security to its regional environment.[81] Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in the early 1950s suggested that Japan should rely on American protection until it had rebuilt its economy as it gradually prepared to stand on its own feet.[82] Japan has laid a firm foundation for doing so by developing much of its own weaponry instead of relying on cheaper imports. Remaining months or moments away from having a nuclear military capability is well designed to protect the country's security without unduly alarming its neighbors.

The hostility of China, of both Koreas, and of Russia combines with inevitable doubts about the extent to which Japan can rely on the United States to protect its security.[83] In the opinion of Masanori Nishi, a defense official, the main cause of Japan's greater "interest in enhanced defense capabilities" is its belief that America's interest in "maintaining regional stability is shaky."[84] Whether reluctantly or not, Japan and China will follow each other on the route

---

78. "The Capability to Develop Nuclear Weapons Should Be Kept: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secret Document in 1969," *Mainichi*, August 1, 1994, p. 41, quoted in Selig S. Harrison, "Japan and Nuclear Weapons," in Harrison, ed., *Japan's Nuclear Future* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 9.

79. David Arase, "US and ASEAN Perceptions of Japan's Role in the Asian-Pacific Region," in Kendall and Joewono, *Japan, ASEAN, and the United States*, p. 276.

80. David E. Sanger, "In Face-Saving Reverse, Japan Disavows Any Nuclear-Arms Expertise," *New York Times*, June 22, 1994, p. 10.

81. Michael J. Green, "State of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy," *Access Asia Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 1998), judiciously summarized different interpretations of Japan's security policy.

82. Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1992), p. 26.

83. Andrew Hanami, for example, points out that Japan wonders whether the United States would help defend Hokkaido. Hanami, "Japan and the Military Balance of Power in Northeast Asia," *Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 1994), p. 364.

84. Stephanie Strom, "Japan Beginning to Flex Its Military Muscles," *New York Times*, April 8, 1999, p. A4.

to becoming great powers. China has the greater long-term potential. Japan, with the world's second or third largest defense budget and the ability to produce the most technologically advanced weaponry, is closer to great power status at the moment.

When Americans speak of preserving the balance of power in East Asia through their military presence,[85] the Chinese understandably take this to mean that they intend to maintain the strategic hegemony they now enjoy in the *absence* of such a balance. When China makes steady but modest efforts to improve the quality of its inferior forces, Americans see a future threat to their and others' interests. Whatever worries the United States has and whatever threats it feels, Japan has them earlier and feels them more intensely. Japan has gradually reacted to them. China then worries as Japan improves its airlift and sealift capabilities and as the United States raises its support level for forces in South Korea.[86] The actions and reactions of China, Japan, and South Korea, with or without American participation, are creating a new balance of power in East Asia, which is becoming part of the new balance of power in the world.

Historically, encounters of East and West have often ended in tragedy. Yet, as we know from happy experience, nuclear weapons moderate the behavior of their possessors and render them cautious whenever crises threaten to spin out of control. Fortunately, the changing relations of East to West, and the changing relations of countries within the East and the West, are taking place in a nuclear context. The tensions and conflicts that intensify when profound changes in world politics take place will continue to mar the relations of nations, while nuclear weapons keep the peace among those who enjoy their protection.

America's policy of containing China by keeping 100,000 troops in East Asia and by providing security guarantees to Japan and South Korea is intended to keep a new balance of power from forming in Asia. By continuing to keep 100,000 troops in Western Europe, where no military threat is in sight, and by extending NATO eastward, the United States pursues the same goal in Europe. The American aspiration to freeze historical development by working to keep the world unipolar is doomed. In the not very long run, the task will exceed America's economic, military, demographic, and political resources; and the very effort to maintain a hegemonic position is the surest way to undermine

85. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); and Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
86. Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 43.

it. The effort to maintain dominance stimulates some countries to work to overcome it. As theory shows and history confirms, that is how balances of power are made. Multipolarity is developing before our eyes. Moreover, it is emerging in accordance with the balancing imperative.

American leaders seem to believe that America's preeminent position will last indefinitely. The United States would then remain the dominant power without rivals rising to challenge it—a position without precedent in modern history. Balancing, of course, is not universal and omnipresent. A dominant power may suppress balancing as the United States has done in Europe. Whether or not balancing takes place also depends on the decisions of governments. Stephanie Neuman's book, *International Relations Theory and the Third World,* abounds in examples of states that failed to mind their own security interests through internal efforts or external arrangements, and as one would expect, suffered invasion, loss of autonomy, and dismemberment.[87] States are free to disregard the imperatives of power, but they must expect to pay a price for doing so. Moreover, relatively weak and divided states may find it impossible to concert their efforts to counter a hegemonic state despite ample provocation. This has long been the condition of the Western Hemisphere.

In the Cold War, the United States won a telling victory. Victory in war, however, often brings lasting enmities. Magnanimity in victory is rare. Winners of wars, facing few impediments to the exercise of their wills, often act in ways that create future enemies. Thus Germany, by taking Alsace and most of Lorraine from France in 1871, earned its lasting enmity; and the Allies' harsh treatment of Germany after World War I produced a similar effect. In contrast, Bismarck persuaded the kaiser not to march his armies along the road to Vienna after the great victory at Königgrätz in 1866. In the Treaty of Prague, Prussia took no Austrian territory. Thus Austria, having become Austria-Hungary, was available as an alliance partner for Germany in 1879. Rather than learning from history, the United States is repeating past errors by extending its influence over what used to be the province of the vanquished.[88] This alienates Russia and nudges it toward China instead of drawing it toward Europe and the United States. Despite much talk about the "globalization" of international politics, American political leaders to a dismaying extent think of East *or* West rather than of their interaction. With a history of conflict

87. Stephanie Neuman, ed., *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998).

88. Tellingly, John Lewis Gaddis comments that he has never known a time when there was less support among historians for an announced policy. Gaddis, "History, Grand Strategy, and NATO Enlargement," *Survival,* Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1998), p. 147.

along a 2,600 mile border, with ethnic minorities sprawling across it, with a mineral-rich and sparsely populated Siberia facing China's teeming millions, Russia and China will find it difficult to cooperate effectively, but the United States is doing its best to help them do so. Indeed, the United States has provided the key to Russian-Chinese relations over the past half century. Feeling American antagonism and fearing American power, China drew close to Russia after World War II and remained so until the United States seemed less, and the Soviet Union more, of a threat to China. The relatively harmonious relations the United States and China enjoyed during the 1970s began to sour in the late 1980s when Russian power visibly declined and American hegemony became imminent. To alienate Russia by expanding NATO, and to alienate China by lecturing its leaders on how to rule their country, are policies that only an overwhelmingly powerful country could afford, and only a foolish one be tempted, to follow. The United States cannot prevent a new balance of power from forming. It can hasten its coming as it has been earnestly doing.

In this section, the discussion of balancing has been more empirical and speculative than theoretical. I therefore end with some reflections on balancing theory. Structural theory, and the theory of balance of power that follows from it, do not lead one to expect that states will always or even usually engage in balancing behavior. Balancing is a strategy for survival, a way of attempting to maintain a state's autonomous way of life. To argue that bandwagoning represents a behavior more common to states than balancing has become a bit of a fad. Whether states bandwagon more often than they balance is an interesting question. To believe that an affirmative answer would refute balance-of-power theory is, however, to misinterpret the theory and to commit what one might call "the numerical fallacy"—to draw a qualitative conclusion from a quantitative result. States try various strategies for survival. Balancing is one of them; bandwagoning is another. The latter may sometimes seem a less demanding and a more rewarding strategy than balancing, requiring less effort and extracting lower costs while promising concrete rewards. Amid the uncertainties of international politics and the shifting pressures of domestic politics, states have to make perilous choices. They may hope to avoid war by appeasing adversaries, a weak form of bandwagoning, rather than by rearming and realigning to thwart them. Moreover, many states have insufficient resources for balancing and little room for maneuver. They have to jump on the wagon only later to wish they could fall off.

Balancing theory does not predict uniformity of behavior but rather the strong tendency of major states in the system, or in regional subsystems, to resort to balancing when they have to. That states try different strategies of

survival is hardly surprising. The recurrent emergence of balancing behavior, and the appearance of the patterns the behavior produces, should all the more be seen as impressive evidence supporting the theory.

Conclusion

Every time peace breaks out, people pop up to proclaim that realism is dead. That is another way of saying that international politics has been transformed. The world, however, has not been transformed; the structure of international politics has simply been remade by the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and for a time we will live with unipolarity. Moreover, international politics was not remade by the forces and factors that some believe are creating a new world order. Those who set the Soviet Union on the path of reform were old Soviet apparatchiks trying to right the Soviet economy in order to preserve its position in the world. The revolution in Soviet affairs and the end of the Cold War were not brought by democracy, interdependence, or international institutions. Instead the Cold War ended exactly as structural realism led one to expect. As I wrote some years ago, the Cold War "is firmly rooted in the structure of postwar international politics and will last as long as that structure endures."[89] So it did, and the Cold War ended only when the bipolar structure of the world disappeared.

Structural change affects the behavior of states and the outcomes their interactions produce. It does not break the essential continuity of international politics. The transformation of international politics alone could do that. Transformation, however, awaits the day when the international system is no longer populated by states that have to help themselves. If the day were here, one would be able to say who could be relied on to help the disadvantaged or endangered. Instead, the ominous shadow of the future continues to cast its pall over interacting states. States' perennial uncertainty about their fates presses governments to prefer relative over absolute gains. Without the shadow, the leaders of states would no longer have to ask themselves how they will get along tomorrow as well as today. States could combine their efforts cheerfully and work to maximize collective gain without worrying about how each might fare in comparison to others.

Occasionally, one finds the statement that governments in their natural, anarchic condition act myopically—that is, on calculations of immediate inter-

89. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), p. 628.

est—while hoping that the future will take care of itself. Realists are said to suffer from this optical defect.[90] Political leaders may be astigmatic, but responsible ones who behave realistically do not suffer from myopia. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane believe that World War I might have been averted if certain states had been able to see how long the future's shadow was.[91] Yet, as their own discussion shows, the future was what the major states were obsessively worried about. The war was prompted less by considerations of present security and more by worries about how the balance might change later. The problems of governments do not arise from their short time horizons. They see the long shadow of the future, but they have trouble reading its contours, perhaps because they try to look too far ahead and see imaginary dangers. In 1914, Germany feared Russia's rapid industrial and population growth. France and Britain suffered from the same fear about Germany, and in addition Britain worried about the rapid growth of Germany's navy. In an important sense, World War I was a preventive war all around. Future fears dominated hopes for short-term gains. States do not live in the happiest of conditions that Horace in one of his odes imagined for man:

> Happy the man, and happy he alone, who can say,
> Tomorrow do thy worst, for I have lived today.[92]

Robert Axelrod has shown that the "tit-for-tat" tactic, and no other, maximizes collective gain over time. The one condition for success is that the game be played under the shadow of the future.[93] Because states coexist in a self-help system, they may, however, have to concern themselves not with maximizing collective gain but with lessening, preserving, or widening the gap in welfare and strength between themselves and others. The contours of the future's shadow look different in hierarchic and anarchic systems. The shadow may facilitate cooperation in the former; it works against it in the latter. Worries

---

90. The point is made by Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 99, 103, 108.
91. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in David Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For German leaders, they say, "the shadow of the future seemed so small" (p. 92). Robert Powell shows that "a longer shadow . . . leads to greater military allocations." See Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), p. 116; see also p. 117 on the question of the compatibility of liberal institutionalism and structural realism.
92. My revision.
93. Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

about the future do not make cooperation and institution building among nations impossible; they do strongly condition their operation and limit their accomplishment. Liberal institutionalists were right to start their investigations with structural realism. Until and unless a transformation occurs, it remains the basic theory of international politics.

The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition
Author(s): John A. Vasquez
Source: *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 899-912
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952172
Accessed: 27/08/2008 03:14

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsa.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

http://www.jstor.org

The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition

JOHN A. VASQUEZ *Vanderbilt University*

Several analysts argue that, despite anomalies, the realist paradigm is dominant because it is more fertile than its rivals. While the ability of the realist paradigm to reformulate its theories in light of criticism accounts for its persistence, it is argued that the proliferation of emendations exposes a degenerating tendency in the paradigm's research program. This article applies Lakatos's criterion that a series of related theories must produce problemshifts that are progressive rather than degenerating to appraise the adequacy of realist-based theories on the balancing of power advanced by neotraditionalists. This research program is seen as degenerating because of (1) the protean character of its theoretical development, (2) an unwillingness to specify what constitutes the true theory, which if falsified would lead to a rejection of the paradigm, (3) a continual adoption of auxiliary propositions to explain away flaws, and (4) a dearth of strong research findings.

Within international relations inquiry, the debate over the adequacy of the realist paradigm has been fairly extensive since the 1970s. In Europe it is often referred to as the interparadigm debate (see Banks 1985; Smith 1995, 18–21). In North America, the focus has been more singularly on realist approaches and their critics (see Vasquez 1983). Toward the end of the 1970s, it appeared that alternate approaches, such as transnational relations and world society perspectives, would supplant the realist paradigm. This did not happen, partly because of the rise of neorealism, especially as embodied in the work of Waltz (1979). Now the debate over the adequacy of the realist paradigm has emerged anew.

In this analysis, *realism* is defined as a set of theories associated with a group of thinkers who emerged just before World War II and who distinguished themselves from idealists (i.e., Wilsonians) on the basis of their belief in the centrality of power for shaping politics, the prevalence of the practices of power politics, and the danger of basing foreign policy on morality or reason rather than interest and power. The *realist paradigm* refers to the shared fundamental assumptions various realist theorists make about the world. Derived primarily from the exemplar of realist scholarship, Morgenthau's ([1948] 1978) *Politics among Nations*, these include: (1) Nation-states are the most important actors in international relations; (2) there is a sharp distinction between domestic and international politics; and (3) international relations is a struggle for power and peace. Understanding how and why that struggle occurs is the major purpose of the discipline (see Vasquez 1983, 15–9, 26–30 for elaboration and justification).

While much of the debate over realism has focused on a comparison to neoliberalism (see Kegley 1995),[1] the debate has also raised new empirical (Rosecrance and Stein 1993), conceptual (Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995, Wendt 1992), and historical (Schroeder 1994a) challenges to the paradigm as a whole. Some call for a sharp break with the paradigm (e.g., Vasquez 1992), while others see the need to reformulate on the basis of known empirical regularities (Wayman and Diehl 1994). Many still see it as the major theoretical framework within which the field must continue to work (Hollis and Smith 1990, 66), and even critics like Keohane ([1983] 1989) and Nye (1988) see the need to synthesize their approaches (in this case neoliberalism) with the realist paradigm.

If any progress is to be made, scholars must have a set of criteria for appraising the empirical component of theories and paradigms (see Vasquez 1992, 1995). Appraising a paradigm, however, is difficult because often its assumptions are not testable, since they typically do not explain anything in and of themselves (e.g., nation-states are the most important actors). Essentially, a paradigm promises scholars that if they view the world in a particular way, they will successfully understand the subject they are studying. In Kuhn's ([1962] 1970, 23–4) language, paradigms do not so much provide answers as the promise of answers. Ultimately, a paradigm must be appraised by its utility and its ability to make good on its promise. Thus, a paradigm can only be appraised indirectly by examining the ability of the theories it generates to satisfy criteria of adequacy.

Within mainstream international relations, the work of Lakatos (1970) has attracted the most consensus as a source of such criteria among both quantitative and

John A. Vasquez is Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235.

The author thanks Marie T. Henehan and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.

[1] "Neoliberalism" is a label employed by a number of scholars (see Nye 1988, 1993, 36–40) to refer to a theoretical approach associated with a cluster of three ideas: (1) Democracies do not fight one another (an idea going back at least to Kant); (2) free trade and growing wealth will create a harmony of interests that will reduce the need for war (the position of the early free traders); and (3) reason can be used to reduce global anarchy and produce more orderly relations among states in part through the creation of global institutions (ideas associated with Grotius and, later, Wilson). For a complete review, see the authors in Kegley 1995; see also Doyle 1986.

traditional scholars (see Keohane [1983] 1989). Although the appraisal of theories and the paradigms from which they are derived involves a number of criteria (see Simowitz and Price 1990), including, in particular, the criterion of empirical accuracy (the ability to pass tests) and the principle of falsifiability, the present analysis will apply only the main criterion on which Lakatos laid great stress for the evaluation of a series of theories: They must produce a progressive as opposed to a degenerating research program. Lakatos's criteria clearly stem from a more positivist perspective, but since realists and neorealists accept them, they are perfectly applicable.[2]

One main difference between Lakatos and early positivists is that Lakatos believes the rules of theory appraisal are community norms and cannot be seen as logically compelling, as Popper (1959) had hoped. The case that any given research program is degenerating (or progressive) cannot be logically proven. Such a stance assumes a foundationalist philosophy of inquiry that has been increasingly under attack in the last two decades (see Hollis and Smith 1990). A more reasonable stance is that exemplified by the trade-off between type 1 and type 2 errors in deciding to accept or reject the null hypothesis. Deciding whether a research program is degenerating involves many individual decisions about where scholars are willing to place their research bets, as well as collective decisions as to which research programs deserve continued funding, publication, and so forth. Some individuals will be willing to take more risks than others. This analysis seeks to present evidence that is relevant to the making of such decisions.

The task of determining whether research programs are progressive or degenerating is of especial importance because a number of analysts (e.g. Hollis and Smith 1990, 66; Wayman and Diehl 1994, 263) argue that, despite anomalies, the realist paradigm is dominant because it is more enlightening and fertile than its rivals. While the ability of the realist paradigm to reformulate its theories in light of conceptual criticism and unexpected events is taken by the above authors as an indicator of its fertility and accounts for its persistence, the proliferation of emendations may not be a healthy sign. Indeed, it can be argued that persistent emendation exposes the degenerating character of the paradigm. This analysis will demonstrate that the "theoretical fertility" apparently exhibited by realism in the last twenty years or so is actually an indicator of the degenerating nature of its research program.

THE CRITERION

Imre Lakatos (1970) argued against Popper (1959) and in favor of Kuhn ([1962] 1970) that no single theory can ever be falsified because auxiliary propositions can be added to account for discrepant evidence. The problem, then, is how to evaluate a *series of theories* that are intellectually related.

A series of theories is exactly what is posing under the general rubrics of realism and neorealism. All these theories share certain fundamental assumptions about how the world works.[3] In Kuhn's ([1962] 1970) language, they constitute a family of theories because they share a paradigm. A *paradigm* can be stipulatively defined as "the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the world they are studying" (Vasquez 1983, 5).[4] Since a paradigm can easily generate a family of theories, Popper's (1959) falsification strategy was seen by Lakatos (1970) as problematic, since one theory can simply be replaced by another in incremental fashion without ever rejecting the shared fundamental assumptions. It was because of this problem that Kuhn's sociological explanation of theoretical change within science was viewed as undermining the standard view in philosophy of science, and it was against Kuhn that Lakatos developed his criteria for appraising a series of theories. To deal with the problem of appraising a series of theories that may share a common paradigm or set of assumptions, Lakatos stipulated that a research program coming out of this core must develop in such a way that theoretical emendations are progressive rather than degenerating.

The main problem with this criterion is that, unless it is applied rigorously, with specific indicators as to what constitutes "progressive" or "degenerating" research programs, it will not provide a basis for settling the debate on the adequacy of the realist paradigm. In an early application of this criterion to structural realism, Keohane ([1983] 1989, 43–4, 52, 55–6, 59), for example, goes back and forth talking about not only the fruitfulness of neorealism but also its incompleteness and the general inability of any international relations theory to satisfy Lakatos's criteria (see also Nye 1988, 243).

Eventually, it would be highly desirable to construct operational indicators of the progressive or degenerating nature of a paradigm's research program. Since these are not available, this analysis will explicitly identify the characteristics that will be used to indicate that a research program is degenerating. Lakatos (1970, 116–7) sees a research program as degenerating if its auxiliary propositions increasingly take on the characteristic of ad hoc explanations that do not produce any novel (theoretical) facts, as well as new empirical content. For Lakatos (p. 116), "no experimental result can ever kill a theory: any theory can be saved from counterinstances either by some auxiliary hypothesis or by a suitable reinterpretation of its terms." Since Lakatos (p. 117) finds this to be the case, he asks: Why not "impose certain standards on the theoretical adjustments by which one is allowed to save a theory?" Adjustments that are acceptable he labels

[2] Vasquez (1995) deals with antifoundationalist postpositivist criticisms of such criteria. On the latter, see Lapid (1989).

[3] Theory is defined here as a set of interrelated propositions purporting to explain behavior; see Vasquez 1992, 835–6. Given this definition, which is noncontroversial, the realist paradigm can have many different theories; see Vasquez 1983, 4–6.

[4] Masterman (1970) has criticized Kuhn for using the concept of paradigm ambiguously. This stipulative definition is meant to overcome this objection, while still capturing the essence of what Kuhn ([1968] 1970, Postscript) was trying to do with the concept.

progressive, and those that are not he labels degenerating.

The key for Lakatos is to evaluate not a single theory but a series of theories linked together. Is each "theoryshift" advancing knowledge, or is it simply a "linguistic device" for saving a theoretical approach?[5] A theoryshift or problemshift is considered (1) theoretically progressive if it theoretically "predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact" and (2) empirically progressive if these new predictions are actually corroborated, giving the new theory an excess empirical content over its rival (Lakatos 1970, 118). In order to be considered progressive, a problemshift must be *both* theoretically and empirically progressive—anything short of that is defined (by default) as *degenerating* (p. 118). A degenerating problemshift or research program, then, is characterized by the use of semantic devices that hide the actual content-decreasing nature of the research program through reinterpretation (p. 119). In this way, the new theory or set of theories are really ad hoc explanations intended to save the theory (p. 117).

It should be clear from this inspection of Lakatos's criterion that progressive research programs are evaluated ultimately on the basis of a criterion of accuracy, in that the new explanations must pass empirical testing. If this is the case, then they must in principle be *falsifiable*. The generation of new insights and the ability to produce a number of research tests, consequently, are not indicators of a progressive research program, if *these do not result in new empirical content that has passed empirical tests*.

How can one tell whether a series of theories that come out of a research program is degenerating? First, the movement from T to T' *may* indicate a degenerating tendency if the revision of T involves primarily the introduction of new concepts or some other reformulation that attempts to explain away discrepant evidence. Second, this will be seen as degenerating if this reformulating never points to any novel unexpected facts, by which Lakatos means that T' should tell scholars something about the world other than what was uncovered by the discrepant evidence. Third, if T' does not have any of its new propositions successfully tested or lacks new propositions (other than those offered to explain away discrepant evidence), then it does not have excess empirical content over T, and this can be an indicator of a degenerating tendency in the research program. Fourth, if a research program goes through a number of theoryshifts, all of which have one or more of the above characteristics *and* the end result of these theoryshifts is that collectively the family of theories fields a set of contradictory hypotheses which greatly increase the probability of at least one passing an empirical test, then a research program can be appraised as degenerating.

[5] Lakatos (1970, 118 n3) notes that by "problemshift" he really means "theoryshift" (i.e., a shift from one specific theory to another) but does not use that word because it "sounds dreadful." Actually, it is much clearer. On the claim that the problemshifts which are degenerating are really just linguistic devices to resolve anomalies in a semantic manner, see Lakatos 1970, 117, 119.

This fourth indicator is crucial and deserves greater explication. It implies that while some latitude may be permitted for the development of ad hoc explanations, the longer this goes on in the face of discrepant evidence, the greater is the likelihood that scientists are engaged in a research program that is constantly repairing one flawed theory after another without any incremental advancement in the empirical content of these theories. What changes is not what is known about the world, but semantic labels to describe discrepant evidence that the original theory(ies) did not anticipate.

How does one determine whether semantic changes are of this sort or the product of a fruitful theoretical development and new insights? An effect of repeated semantic changes which are not progressive is that they focus almost entirely on trying to deal with experimental outcomes or empirical patterns contrary to the initial predictions of the theory. One consequence is that collectively the paradigm begins to embody contradictory propositions, such as (1) war is likely when power is not balanced and one side is preponderant, and (2) war is likely when power is relatively equal. The development of two or more contradictory propositions increases the probability that at least one of them will pass an empirical test. If a series of theories, all derived from the same paradigm (and claiming a family resemblance, such as by using the same name, e.g., Freudian, Marxist, or realist), predict several competing outcomes as providing support for the paradigm, then this is an example of the fourth indicator. Carried to an extreme, the paradigm could prevent any kind of falsification, because collectively its propositions in effect pose the bet: "Heads, I win; tails, you lose." A research program can be considered blatantly degenerative if one or more of the behaviors predicted is only predicted after the fact.

To be progressive, a theoryshift needs to do more than just explain away the discrepant evidence. It should show how the logic of the original or reformulated theory can account for the discrepant evidence and then delineate how this theoretic can give rise to new propositions and predictions (or observations) that the original theory did not anticipate. The generation of new predictions is necessary because one cannot logically test a theory on the basis of the discrepant evidence that led to the theoryshift in the first place, since the outcome of the statistical test is already known (and therefore cannot be objectively predicted before the fact). The stipulation of new hypotheses that pass empirical testing on some basis other than the discrepant evidence is the minimal logical condition for being progressive. Just *how* fruitful or progressive a theoryshift is, beyond the minimal condition, depends very much on how insightful and/or unexpected the novel facts embodied in the auxiliary hypotheses are deemed to be by scholars within the field. Do they tell scholars things they did not (theoretically) know before?

It should be clear that the criteria of adequacy involve the application of disciplinary norms as to what constitutes progress. The four indicators outlined

above provide reasonable and fairly explicit ways to interpret the evidence. Applying them to a body of research should permit a basis for determining whether a research program appears to be on the whole degenerative or progressive.

It will be argued that what some see as theoretical enrichment of the realist paradigm is actually a proliferation of emendations that prevent it from being falsified. It will be shown that the realist paradigm has exhibited (1) a protean character in its theoretical development, which plays into (2) an unwillingness to specify what form(s) of the theory constitutes the true theory, which if falsified would lead to a rejection of the paradigm, as well as (3) a continual and persistent adoption of auxiliary propositions to explain away empirical and theoretical flaws that greatly exceed the ability of researchers to test the propositions and (4) a general dearth of strong empirical findings. Each of these four characteristics can be seen as "the facts" that need to be established or denied to make a decision about whether a given research program is degenerating.

THE RESEARCH PROGRAM TO BE ANALYZED

Any paradigm worth its salt will have more than one ongoing research program, so in assessing research programs it is important to select those that focus on a core area of the paradigm and not on areas that are more peripheral or can be easily accommodated by a competing paradigm. It also is important that the research program be fairly well developed both in terms of the number of scholars and the amount of time spent on the program.

If one uses Kuhn's ([1962] 1970) analysis to understand the post–World War II development of the field of international relations, there is a general consensus that the realist paradigm has dominated international relations inquiry within the English-speaking world and that Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* can be seen as the exemplar of this paradigm (see Vasquez 1983 for a test of this claim; see also Banks 1985; Smith 1995; Olson and Groom 1991; and George 1994). Neorealism can be seen as a further articulation of the realist paradigm along at least two lines. The first, by Waltz (1979), brought the insights of structuralism to bear on realism and for this reason is often referred to as structural realism. For Waltz (1979), structure (specifically the anarchic nature of the international system) is presented as the single most important factor affecting all other behavior. The second by Gilpin (1981), brought to bear some of the insights of political economy with emphasis on the effect of the rise and decline of hegemons on historical change. Both of these efforts have developed research programs. Generally, it is fair to say that Waltz has had more influence on security studies, whereas Gilpin has been primarily influential on questions of international political economy. Since the main concern here is with security, peace, and war, this appraisal will concentrate on the work of scholars who have been influenced by Waltz.

A complete case against the realist paradigm needs to look at other aspects of neorealism and to examine classical realism as well. Elsewhere, the quantitative work guided by classical realism has been evaluated (Vasquez 1983). Gilpin's work on war is best treated in conjunction with the power transition thesis of Organski and Kugler (1980), with which it shares a number of similarities (for an initial appraisal see Vasquez 1993, chapter 3; 1996). So, part of the reason for focusing on Waltz and the research agenda sparked by his analysis is that only so much work can be reviewed in depth in a single article.[6] The more compelling reason is that Waltz's analysis has in fact had a great impact on empirical research. His influence on those who study security questions within international relations in what may be called a neotraditional (i.e., nonquantitative) manner is without equal.

Waltz (1979) centers on two empirical questions: (1) explaining what he considers a fundamental law of international politics, the balancing of power, and (2) delineating the differing effects of bipolarity and multipolarity on system stability. While the latter has recently given rise to some vehement debates about the future of the post–Cold War era (see Mearsheimer 1990, Van Evera 1990/91; see also Kegley and Raymond 1994), it has not yet generated a sustained research program. In contrast, the first area has. The focus of this appraisal will be not so much on Waltz himself as on the neotraditional research program that has taken his proposition on balancing and investigated it empirically. This work is fairly extensive and appears to many to be both cumulative and fruitful. Specifically, the analysis will review the work of Walt (1987) and Schweller (1994) on balancing and bandwagoning, the work of Christensen and Snyder (1990) on "buck-passing" and "chain-ganging," and historical case studies that have uncovered discrepant evidence to see how these works have been treated in the field by proponents of the realist paradigm.

In addition, unlike the work on polarity, that on balancing focuses on a core area for both classical realism and neorealism. It is clearly a central proposition within the paradigm (see Vasquez 1983, 183–94), and concerns with it can be traced back to David Hume and from him to the Ancients in the West, India, and China. Given the prominence of the balance-of-power concept, a research program devoted to investigating Waltz's analysis of the balancing of power, which has attracted widespread attention and is generally well treated in the current literature, cannot fail to pass an examination of whether it is degenerating or progressive without reflecting on the paradigm as a whole—either positively or negatively.

Before beginning this appraisal it is important to keep in mind that the criterion on research programs being progressive is only one of several that can be applied to a paradigm. A full appraisal would involve the application of other criteria, such as accuracy, to all

[6] For reason of space I also do not examine formal models of the balance of power, such as those of Wagner (1986) or Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose (1989).

areas of the paradigm. Clearly, such an effort is beyond the scope of this analysis. This article provides only one appraisal, albeit a very important one, of a number that need to be conducted. As other appraisals are completed, more evidence will be acquired to make an overall assessment.

Likewise, because only the research program on balancing is examined, it can be argued that logically only conclusions about balancing (and not the other aspects of the realist paradigm) can be made. This is a legitimate position to take in that it would be illogical (as well as unfair) to generalize conclusions about one research program to others of the paradigm. Those obviously need to be evaluated separately and appraised on their own merit. They may pass or fail an appraisal based on the criterion of progressivity or on other criteria, such as empirical accuracy or falsifiability. Nevertheless, while this is true, it is just as illogical to assume in the absence of such appraisals that all is well with the other research programs.[7]

In fact, the conclusions of this study are not inconsistent with other recent work which finds fundamental deficiencies in the realist paradigm on other grounds, using different methods and addressing different questions—for example, that by Rosecrance and Stein (1993), who look at the role of domestic politics (cf. Snyder and Jervis 1993); Lebow and Risse-Kappen (1995), who examine realist and nonrealist explanations of the end of the Cold War; and George (1994), who examines the closed nature of realist thinking and its negative effects on the field.

Logically, while this analysis can only draw conclusions about the degeneracy (or progressiveness) of the research program on balancing, the implication of failing or passing this appraisal for the paradigm as a whole is not an irrelevant issue. If Waltz's neorealism is seen as reflecting well on the theoretical robustness and fertility of the realist paradigm (Hollis and Smith 1990, 66), then the failure of a research program meant to test his theory must have some negative effect on the paradigm. The question is how negative. The concluding section will return to this issue, since such matters are more fruitfully discussed in light of specific evidence rather than in the abstract.

THE BALANCING OF POWER: THE GREAT NEW LAW THAT TURNED OUT NOT TO BE SO

One of Waltz's (1979) main purposes was to explain what in his view is a fundamental law of international politics: the balancing of power. Waltz (pp. 5, 6, 9) defines theory as statements that explain laws (i.e., regularities of behavior). For Waltz (p. 117), "whenever agents and agencies are coupled by force and competition rather than authority and law," they exhibit "certain repeated and enduring patterns." These he says have been identified by the tradition of *Realpolitik*. Of these the most central pattern is balance of power, of which he says: "If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it" (p. 117). He maintains that a self-help system "stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power" (p. 118) and that "these balances tend to form whether some or all states consciously aim to establish [them]" (p. 119). This law or regularity is what the first six of the nine chapters in *Theory of International Politics* are trying to explain (see, in particular, Waltz 1979, 116–28).

The main problem, of course, is that many scholars, including many realists, such as Morgenthau ([1948] 1978, chapter 14), do not see balancing as the given law Waltz takes it to be. In many ways, raising it to the status of a law dismisses all the extensive criticism that has been made of the concept (Claude 1962; Haas 1953; Morgenthau [1948] 1978, chapter 14) (see Waltz 1979, 50–9, 117, for a review). Likewise, it also sidesteps a great deal of the theoretical and empirical work suggesting that the balance of power, specifically, is not associated with the preservation of peace (Organski 1958; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; see also the more recent Bueno de Mesquita 1981; the earlier work is discussed in Waltz 1979, 14–5, 119).

Waltz (1979) avoided contradicting this research by arguing, like Gulick (1955), that a balance of power does not always preserve the peace because it often requires wars to be fought to maintain the balance. What Waltz does here is separate two possible functions of the balance of power—protection of the state in terms of its survival versus the avoidance of war or maintenance of the peace. Waltz does not see the latter as a legitimate prediction of balance-of-power theory. All he requires is that states attempt to balance, not that balancing prevents war.

From the perspective of Kuhn ([1962] 1970, 24, 33–4) one can see Waltz (1979) as articulating a part of the dominant realist paradigm. Waltz is elaborating one of the problems (puzzles as Kuhn [1962] 1970, 36–7, would call them) that Morgenthau left unresolved in *Politics among Nations*; namely, how and why the balance of power can be expected to work and how major a role this concept should play within the paradigm. Waltz's (1979) book can be seen as a theoryshift that places the balance of power in much more positive light than does Morgenthau (cf. 1978, chapter 14). This theoryshift tries to resolve the question of whether the balance is associated with peace by saying that it is not. Waltz, unlike Morgenthau, sees the balance as automatic; it is not the product of a particular leadership's diplomacy but of system structure. The focus on system structure and the identification of "anarchy" are two of the original contributions of Waltz (1979). These can be seen as the introduction of new concepts that bring novel facts into the paradigm. Such a shift appears progressive, but whether it proves to be so turns on whether the predictions made by the explanation can pass empirical testing.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the proposition on balancing is the focus of much of the research of younger political scientists influenced by

[7] I am currently engaged in a project to appraise various aspects of the realist paradigm on a variety of criteria; see Vasquez n.d.

Waltz. Walt, Schweller, Christensen and Snyder, and the historian Schroeder all cite Waltz and consciously address his theoretical proposition on balancing. They also cite and build upon the work of one another; that is, those who discuss bandwagoning cite Walt (e.g., Levy and Barrett 1991, Schweller 1994; those who talk about buckpassing cite Christensen and Snyder, 1990). More fundamentally, they generally are interested (with the exception of Schroeder, who is a critic) in working within the realist paradigm and/or defending it. They differ in terms of how they defend realism. Because they all share certain concepts, are concerned with balancing, and share a view of the world and the general purpose of trying to work within and defend the paradigm, they all can be seen as working on the same general research program. Thus, what they have found and how they have tried to account for their findings provide a good case for appraising the extent to which this particular research program is progressive or degenerating.

Balancing versus Bandwagoning

A passing comment Waltz (1979, 126) makes about his theory is that in anarchic systems (unlike domestic systems), balancing not bandwagoning (a term for which he thanks Stephen Van Evera) is the typical behavior.[8] This is one of the few unambiguous empirical predictions in his theory; Waltz (p. 121) states: "Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive."

The first major test is conducted by Walt (1987), who looks primarily at the Middle East from 1955 to 1979. He maintains that "balancing is more common than bandwagoning" (Walt 1987, 33). Consistent with Waltz, he argues that, in general, states should not be expected to bandwagon except under certain identifiable conditions (p. 28). Contrary to Waltz, however, he finds that they do not balance power! Instead, he shows that they balance against threat (chapter 5), while recognizing that for many realists, states should balance against power (pp. 18–9, 22–3).[9] He then extends his analysis to East-West relations and shows that if states were really concerned with power, then they would not have allied so extensively with the United States, which had a very overwhelming coalition against the USSR and its allies. Such a coalition was a result not of the power of the USSR but of its perceived threat (pp. 273–81).

Here is a clear falsification of Waltz (in the naive falsification sense of Popper 1959; see Lakatos 1970, 116), but how does Walt deal with this counterevidence or counterinstance, as Lakatos would term it? He takes a very incrementalist position. He explicitly maintains that balance of threat "should be viewed as a refinement of traditional balance of power theory" (Walt 1987, 263). Yet, in what way is this a "refinement" and not an unexpected anomalous finding, given Waltz's prediction? For Morgenthau and Waltz, the greatest source of threat to a state comes from the possible power advantages another state may have over it. In a world that is assumed to be a struggle for power and a self-help system, a state *capable* of making a threat must be guarded against because no one can be assured when it may actualize that potential. Hence, states must balance against power regardless of immediate threat. If, however, power and threat are independent, as they are perceived to be by the states in Walt's sample, then something may be awry in the realist world. The only thing that reduces the anomalous nature of the finding is that it has not been shown to hold for the central system of major states, that is, modern Europe. If it could be demonstrated that the European states balanced threat and not power, then that would be a serious if not devastating blow for neorealism and the paradigm.[10]

As it stands, despite the rhetorical veneer, Walt's findings are consistent with the thrust of other empirical research: The balance of power does not seem to work or produce the patterns that many theorists have expected it to produce. For Walt, it turns out that states balance but not for reasons of power, a rather curious finding for Waltz, but one entirely predictable given the results of previous research that found the balance of power was not significantly related to war and peace (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; see also Vasquez 1983, 183–94).

The degenerating tendency of the research program in this area can be seen in how Walt conceptualizes his findings and in how the field "refines" them further. "Balance of threat" is a felicitous phrase. The very phraseology makes states' behavior appear much more consistent with the larger paradigm than it actually is. It rhetorically captures all the connotations and emotive force of balance of power while changing it only incrementally. It appears as a refinement—insightful and supportive of the paradigm. In doing so, it strips away the anomalous nature and devastating potential of the findings for Waltz's explanation.

This problemshift, however, exhibits all four of the characteristics outlined earlier as indicative of degenerative tendencies within a research program. First, the new concept, "balance of threat," is introduced to explain why states do not balance in the way Waltz theorizes. The balance of threat concept does not appear in Waltz (1979) or in the literature before Walt introduced it in conjunction with his findings. Second, the concept does not point to any novel facts other than

[8] For Waltz (1979, 126), bandwagoning is allying with the strongest power, that is, the one capable of establishing hegemony. He maintains that such an alignment will be dangerous to the survival of states. Walt (1987, 17, 21–2) defines the term similarly but introduces the notion of threat: "*Balancing* is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; *bandwagoning* refers to alignment with the source of danger" (italics in original).

[9] Walt (1987, 172) concludes: "The main point should be obvious: balance of threat theory is superior to balance of power theory. Examining the impact of several related but distinct sources of threat can provide a more persuasive account of alliance formation than can focusing solely on the distribution of aggregate capabilities."

[10] Schroeder (1994a and b) provides this devastating evidence on Europe (see also Schweller 1994, 89–92).

the discrepant evidence. Third, therefore this new variant of realism does not have any excess empirical content compared to the original theory, except that it now takes the discrepant evidence and says it supports a new variant of realism.

These three degenerating characteristics open up the possibility that, when both the original balance of power proposition and the new balance of threat proposition (T and T', respectively) are taken as two versions of realism, either behavior can be seen as evidence supporting realist theory (in some form) and hence the realist paradigm or approach in general. Waltz (1979, 121) allows a clear test, because bandwagoning is taken to be the opposite of balancing. Now, Walt splits the concept of balancing into two components, either one of which will support the realist paradigm (because the second is but "a refinement" of balance-of-power theory). From outside the realist paradigm, this appears as a move to dismiss discrepant evidence and explain it away by an ad hoc theoryshift. Such a move is also a degenerating shift on the basis of the fourth indicator, because it reduces the probability that the corpus of realist propositions can be falsified. Before Walt wrote, the set of empirical behavior in which states *could* engage that would be seen as evidence falsifying Waltz's balancing proposition was much broader than it was after Walt wrote.

The danger posed by such theoryshifts can be seen by conducting a mental experiment. Would the following theoretical emendation be regarded as a progressive shift? Let us suppose that the concept of bandwagoning now becomes the focus of empirical research in its own right. Waltz (1979, 126) firmly states: "Balancing not bandwagoning is the behavior induced by the system." (Walt 1987, 32, agrees.) If someone finds bandwagoning to be more frequent, should such a finding be seen as an anomaly for Waltz's T, Walt's T', and the realist paradigm, or simply as the foundation to erect yet another version of realism (T'')? If the latter were to occur, it would demonstrate yet further degeneration of the paradigm's research program and an unwillingness of these researchers to see anything as anomalous for the paradigm as a whole.

By raising the salience of the bandwagoning concept and giving an explanation of it, Walt leaves the door open to the possibility that situations similar to the experiment may occur within the research program. Through this door walks Schweller (1994), who argues in contradiction to Walt that bandwagoning is more common than balancing. From this he weaves "an alternative theory of alliances" that he labels "balance of interests," another felicitous phrase, made even more picturesque by his habit of referring to states as jackals, wolves, lambs, and lions. Schweller (1994, 86) argues that his theory is even more realist than Waltz's, because he bases his analysis on the assumption of the classical realists—states strive for greater power and expansion—and not on security, as Waltz (1979, 126) assumes. Waltz is misled, according to Schweller (1994, 85–8), because of his status-quo bias. If he were to look at things from the perspective of a revisionist state, he would see why they bandwagon: to gain rewards (and presumably power).

Schweller (1994, 89–92), in a cursory review of European history, questions the extent to which states have balanced and argues instead that they mostly bandwagon. To establish this claim, he redefines bandwagoning more broadly than Walt; it is no longer the opposite of balancing (i.e., siding with the actor who poses the greatest threat or has the most power) but simply any attempt to side with the stronger, especially for opportunistic gain. Because the stronger state often does not pose a direct threat to every weak state, this kind of behavior is much more common and distinct from what Walt meant.

Two things about Schweller (1994) are important for the appraisal of this research program. First, despite the vehemence of his attack on the balancing proposition, this is nowhere seen as a deficiency of the realist paradigm; rather, it is Waltz's distortion of classical realism (however, see Morgenthau [1948] 1978, 194). The latter is technically true, in that Waltz raises the idea of balancing to the status of a law, but one would think that the absence of balancing in world politics, especially in European history, would have some negative effect on the realist view of the world. Certainly, Schweller's "finding" that bandwagoning is more prevalent than balancing is something classical realists, such as Morgenthau ([1948] 1978), Dehio (1961), or Kissinger (1994, 20–1, 67–8, 166–7) would find very disturbing. They would not expect this to be the typical behavior of states, and if it did occur, they would see it as a failure to follow a rational foreign policy and/or to pursue a prudent realist course (see Morgenthau [1948] 1978, 7–8).

Second, and more important, Schweller's theoryshift (T'') has made bandwagoning a "confirming" piece of evidence for the realist paradigm. So, if he turns out to be correct, his theory, which he says is even more realist than Waltz's, will be confirmed. If he is incorrect, then Waltz's version of realism will be confirmed. Under what circumstances will the realist paradigm be considered as having failed to pass an empirical test? The field is now in a position (in this research program) where any one of the following can be taken as evidence supporting the realist paradigm: balancing of power, balancing of threat, and bandwagoning. At the same time, the paradigm as a whole has failed to specify what evidence will be accepted as falsifying it—a clear violation of Popper's (1959) principle of falsifiability. Findings revealing the absence of balancing of power and the presence of balancing of threat or bandwagoning are taken by these researchers as supporting the realist paradigm; instead, from the perspective of those outside the paradigm, these outcomes should be taken as anomalies. All their new concepts do is try to hide the anomaly through semantic labeling (see Lakatos 1970, 117, 119). Each emendation tries to salvage something but does so by moving farther and farther away from the original concept. Thus, Waltz moves from the idea of a balance of power to simply balancing power, even if it does not prevent war. Walt finds that states do not balance power but oppose

threats to themselves. Schweller argues that states do not balance against the stronger but more frequently bandwagon with it to take advantage of opportunities to gain rewards.

Walt and Schweller recognize discrepant evidence and explain it away by using a balance phraseology that hides the fact the observed behavior is fundamentally different from that expected by the original theory. The field hardly needs realism to tell it that states will oppose threats to themselves (if they can) or that revisionist states will seize opportunities to gain rewards (especially if the risks are low). In addition, these new concepts do not point to any novel theoretical facts; they are not used to describe or predict any pattern or behavior other than the discrepant patterns that undercut the original theory.

Ultimately, under the fourth indicator, such theory-shifts are also degenerating because they increase the probability that the realist paradigm will pass some test, since three kinds of behavior now can be seen as confirmatory. While any one version of realism (balance of power, balancing power, balance of threats, balance of interests) may be falsified, the paradigm itself will live on and, indeed, be seen as theoretically robust. In fact, the protean character of realism prevents the paradigm from being falsified because as soon as one theoretical variant is discarded, another variant pops up to replace it as the "true realism" or the "new realism."

The point is not that Walt or others are engaged in "bad" scholarship or have made mistakes; indeed, just the opposite is the case: They are practicing the discipline the way the dominant paradigm leads them to practice it. They are theoretically articulating the paradigm in a normal science fashion, solving puzzles, engaging the historical record, and coming up with new insights—all derived from neorealism's exemplar and the paradigm from which it is derived. In doing so, however, these individual decisions reflect a collective degeneration.

Even as it is, other research on bandwagoning (narrowly defined) has opened up further anomalies for the realist paradigm by suggesting that a main reason for bandwagoning (and indeed for making alliances in general) may not be the structure of the international system but domestic political considerations. Larson (1991, 86–7) argues antithetically to realism that states in a similar position in the international system and with similar relative capabilities behave differently with regard to bandwagoning; therefore, there must be some intervening variable to explain the difference. On the basis of a comparison of cases, she argues that some elites bandwagon to preserve their domestic rule (see also Strauss 1991, 245, who sees domestic considerations and cultural conceptions of world politics as critical intervening variables). Similarly, Levy and Barnett (1991, 1992) present evidence on Egypt and Third World states showing that internal needs and domestic political concerns are often more important in alliance making than are external threats. This research suggests that realist assumptions—the primacy of the international struggle for power and the unitary rational nature of the state will lead elites to formulate foreign policy strictly in accord with the national interest defined in terms of power are flawed. Theories need to take greater cognizance of the role domestic concerns play in shaping foreign policy objectives. To the extent bandwagoning is a "novel" fact (even if not a predominant pattern), it points us away from the dominant paradigm, not back to its classical formulation.

Buck-passing and Chain-ganging

The bandwagoning research program is not the only way in which the protean character of realism has been revealed. Another and perhaps even more powerful example is the way in which Christensen and Snyder (1990) have dealt with the failure of states to balance. They begin by criticizing Waltz for being too parsimonious and making indeterminate predictions about balancing under multipolarity. They then seek to correct this defect within realism, by specifying that states will engage in chain-ganging or buck-passing depending on the perceived balance between offense and defense. Chain-ganging occurs when states, especially strong states, commit "themselves unconditionally to reckless allies whose survival is seen to be indispensable to the maintenance of the balance"; buck-passing is a failure to balance and reliance on "third parties to bear the costs of stopping a rising hegemon" (Christensen and Snyder 1990, 138). The alliance pattern that led to World War I is given as an example of chain-ganging, and Europe in the 1930s is given as an example of buck-passing. The propositions are applied only to multipolarity; in bipolarity, balancing is seen as unproblematic.

This article is another example of how the realist paradigm (since Waltz) has been articulated in a normal science fashion. The authors find a gap in Waltz's explanation and try to correct it by bringing in a variable from Jervis (1978; see also Van Evera 1984). This gives the impression of cumulation and progress through further specification, especially since they have come up with a fancy title for labeling what Waltz identified as possible sources of instability in multipolarity.

A closer inspection reveals the degenerating character of their emendation. The argument that states will either engage in buck-passing or chain-ganging under multipolarity is an admission that in important instances, such as the 1930s, states fail to balance the way Waltz (1979) says they must because of the system's structure. Recall Waltz's (1979, 121) clear prediction that "balance-of-power politics will prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: anarchy and units wishing to survive." Surely, these requirements were met in the period before World War II, and therefore failure to balance should be taken as falsifying evidence.

Christensen and Snyder (1990) seem to want to explain away the 1930s, in which they argue there was a great deal of buck-passing. Waltz (1979, 164–5, 167),

however, never says that states will not conform overall) to the law of balancing in multipolarity, only that there are more "difficulties" in doing so. If Christensen and Snyder see the 1930s as a failure to balance properly, then this is an anomaly that needs to be explained away. The buck-passing/chain-ganging concept does that in a rhetorical flourish that grabs attention and seems persuasive. Yet, it "rescues" the theory not simply from indeterminate predictions, as Christensen and Snyder (1990, 146) put it, but explains away a critical case that the theory should have predicted.

This seems to be especially important because, contrary to what Waltz and Christensen and Snyder postulate, balancing through alliances should be more feasible under multipolarity than bipolarity, because under the latter there simply are not any other major states with whom to align. Thus, Waltz (1979, 168) says that under bipolarity *internal* balancing is more predominant and precise than external balancing. If under bipolarity there is, according to Waltz, a tendency to balance (internally, i.e., through military buildups), and under multipolarity there is, according to Christensen and Snyder, a tendency to pass the buck or chain-gang, then when exactly do we get the kind of alliance balancing that we attribute to the traditional balance of power Waltz has decreed as a law? Christensen and Snyder's analysis appears as a "protean-shift" in realism that permits the paradigm to be confirmed if states balance (internally or externally), chain-gang, or buck-pass (as well as bandwagon, see Schweller 1994). This is degenerative under the fourth indicator because the probability of falsification decreases to a very low level. It seems to increase greatly the probability that empirical tests will be passed by some form of realism.[11]

Imprecise measurement leaving open the possibility for ad hoc interpretation is also a problem with identifying buck-passing and chain-ganging. Were Britain, France, and the USSR passing the buck in the late 1930s, or were they just slow to balance? Or were Britain and France pursuing an entirely different strategy, appeasement, because of the lessons they derived from World War I? If the latter, which seems more plausible, then buck-passing is not involved at all, and the factor explaining alliance behavior is not multipolarity but an entirely different variable (see Rosecrance and Steiner 1993). What is even more troubling is that while Christensen and Snyder (1990) see pre-1939 as buck-passing and pre-1914 as chain-ganging, it seems that Britain was much more hesitant to enter the war in 1914 than in 1939, contrary to what one would expect given the logic of Christensen and Snyder's historical analysis.[12] After Hitler took Prague in March 1939, domestic public and elite opinion moved toward a commitment to war (Rosecrance and Steiner 1993, 140), but in 1914 that commitment never came before the outbreak of hostilities (see Levy 1990/91). The cabinet was split, and only the violation of Belgium tipped the balance. Thus, the introduction of the new refinement is far from a clear or unproblematic solution to the anomaly on its own terms.

The refinements of Waltz produced by the literature on bandwagoning and buck-passing are degenerating because they hide, rather than deal directly with, the seriousness of the anomalies they are trying to handle. A theory whose main purpose is to explain balancing cannot stand if balancing is not the law it says it is. Such an anomaly also reflects negatively on the paradigm as a whole. Even though Morgenthau ([1948] 1978, chapter 14) did not think the balance of power was very workable, power variables are part of the central core of his work, and he does say that the balance of power is "a natural and inevitable outgrowth of the struggle of power" and "a protective device of an alliance of nations, anxious for their independence, against another nation's designs for world domination" (Morgenthau [1948] 1978, 194, and see 173, 195–6). Waltz's (1979) theory, which has been characterized as a systematization of classical realism (Keohane 1986, 15) and widely seen as such, cannot fail on one of its few concrete predictions without reflecting badly (in some sense) on the larger paradigm in which it is embedded.

Historical Case Studies

Unlike the explicitly sympathetic work cited above, several historical case studies that focus on the balancing hypothesis give rise to more severe criticism of realist theory. Rosecrance and Stein (1993, 7) see the balancing proposition as the key prediction of structural realism. In a series of case studies, they challenge the idea that balancing power actually occurs or explains very much of the grand strategy of the twentieth-century major states they examine; to explain grand strategy for them requires examining domestic politics (Rosecrance and Stein 1993, 10, 17–21). In contradiction to structural realism, they find that balance-of-power concerns do not take "precedence over domestic factors or restraints" (Rosecrance and Stein 1993, 17). Britain in 1938, the United States in 1940, and even the Soviet Union facing Reagan in 1985 fail to meet powerful external challenges, in part because of domestic political factors (Rosecrance and Stein 1993, 18, and see the related case studies in chapters 5–7). States sometimes under- or overbalance. As Rosecrance (1995, 145) maintains, states rarely get it right—they either commit too much or too little, or they become so concerned with the periphery that they overlook what is happening to the core (see Kupchan 1994, Thompson and Zuk 1986). And, of course, they do this

[11] Of course, one may argue that Christensen and Snyder's (1994) proposition on offense-defense is falsifiable in principle, and that is true, but this points out another problem with their analysis; namely, Levy (1984) is unable to distinguish in specific historical periods whether offense or defense has the advantage (see Christensen and Snyder 1990, 139, 6 and 7). They, in turn, rely on the perception of offense and defense, but such a "belief" variable takes us away from realism and toward a more psychological-cognitive paradigm.

[12] Christensen and Snyder (1990, 156) recognize British buck-passing in 1914, but they say Britain was an outlier and "did not entirely pass the buck."

because they are not the unitary rational actors the realist paradigm thinks they are. Contrary to Waltz, and even Morgenthau, states engage in much more variegated behavior than the realist paradigm suggests.

This last point is demonstrated even more forcibly by the historian Paul Schroeder (1994a and b). He shows that the basic generalizations of Waltz—that anarchy leads states to balancing and to act on the basis of their power position—are not principles that tell the "real story" of what happened from 1648 to 1945. He demonstrates that states do not balance in a law-like manner but deal with threat in a variety of ways; among others, they hide, they join the stronger side, they try to "transcend" the problem, or they balance. In a brief but systematic review of the major conflicts in the modern period, he shows that in the Napoleonic wars, Crimean War, World War I, and World War II there was no real balancing of an alleged hegemonic threat—so much for the claim that this kind of balancing is a fundamental law of international politics. When states do resist, as they did with Napoleon, it is because they have been attacked and have no choice: "They resisted because France kept on attacking them" (Schroeder 1994a, 135; see also Schweller 1994, 92). A similar point also could be made about French, British, Soviet, and American resistance to Hitler and Japan.

Basically, Schroeder shows that the historical record in Europe does not conform to neorealists' theoretical expectations about balancing power. Their main generalizations are simply wrong. For instance, Schroeder does not see balancing against Napoleon, the prime instance in European history in which it should have occurred (see also Rosecrance and Lo 1996). Many states left the First Coalition against revolutionary France after 1793, when they should not have, given France's new power potential. Periodically, states bandwagoned with France, especially after victories, as in late 1799, when the Second Coalition collapsed. According to Schroeder (1994a, 120–1), hiding or bandwagoning, not balancing, was the main response to the Napoleonic hegemonic threat, the exact opposite of the assertions not only by Waltz but also by such long-time classical realists as Dehio (1961). For World War I, Schroeder (1994a, 122–3) argues that the balancing versus bidding for hegemony conceptualization simply does not make much sense of what each side was doing in trying to deal with security problems. With World War II, Schroeder (1994a, 123–4) sees a failure of Britain and France to balance and sees many states trying to hide or bandwagon.[13]

For Schroeder (1994a, 115, 116), neorealist theory is a misleading guide to inquiry:

> The more one examines Waltz's historical generalizations about the conduct of international politics throughout history with the aid of the historian's knowledge of the actual course of history, the more doubtful—in fact, strange—these generalizations become.... I cannot construct a history of the European states system from 1648 to 1945 based on the generalization that most unit actors within that system responded to crucial threats to their security and independence by resorting to self-help, as defined above. In the majority of instances this just did not happen.

All this suggests that the balancing of power was never the law Waltz thought it was. In effect, he offered an explanation of a behavioral regularity that never existed, except within the logic of the theory. As Schroeder (1994b, 147) concludes:

> [My point has been] to show how a normal, standard understanding of neo-realist theory, applied precisely to the historical era where it should fit best, gets the motives, the process, the patterns, and the broad outcomes of international history wrong... it prescribes and predicts a determinate order for history without having adequately checked this against the historical evidence.

SHIRKING THE EVIDENCE AND PROVING THE POINT

How have scholars sympathetic to realism responded to Schroeder? They have sought to deny everything and done so precisely in the degenerating manner that Lakatos (1970, 116–9) predicted. The reaction by Elman and Elman (1995) to Schroeder in the correspondence section of *International Security* illustrates best the extent to which the last ten years of realist research have cumulated in degenerating problem-shifts. Elman and Elman (1995) make three points against Schroeder (1994a). First, although his evidence may challenge Waltz's particular theory, it still leaves the larger neorealist approach unscathed. Second, Waltz recognizes balancing failures so that not every instance of these necessarily disconfirms his theory. Third, even if Schroeder's evidence on balancing poses a problem for Waltz, "only better theories can displace theories.... Thus, Waltz's theory should not be discarded until something better comes along to replace it" (Elman and Elman 1995, 192).

The first point somewhat misses the mark, since so much of neorealism is associated with Waltz. There remains mostly Gilpin (1981) and Krasner (1978). It is primarily Gilpin whom Elman and Elman have in mind when they argue that Schroeder's "omission of entire neo-realist literatures" leads him to fail to understand that "balancing is not the only strategy which is logically compatible with neo-realist assumptions of anarchy and self-help" (Elman and Elman 1995, 185, 186; see also Schweller 1992, 267, whom they cite).[14] They argue that for Gilpin (1981) and power transition theory "balancing is not considered a prevalent strategy, nor are balances predicted to occur repeatedly" (Elman and Elman 1995, 186). The problem with using Gilpin and the more quantitatively oriented power transition thesis of Organski and Kugler (1980) is that the two main pillars of neorealism predict contradic-

[13] Numerous other deviant cases are listed in Schroeder (1994a, 118–22, 126–9, 133–47).

[14] By saying that Schroeder leaves much of the neorealist approach unscathed, Elman and Elman (1995) seem to fall into the trap of assuming that Gilpin (1981) is empirically accurate unless proven otherwise. In fact, as related to security questions, Gilpin (1981) has not been extensively tested, and existing tests are not very encouraging (see Spiezio 1990, as well as Boswell and Sweat (1991) and the discussion in Vasquez 1993, 93–8).

tory things. Thus, between Waltz and Gilpin, threat can be handled by either balancing or not balancing. It certainly is not a very strong defense of neorealism to say that opposite behaviors are both logically compatible with the assumptions of anarchy.

The Elmans are technically correct that evidence against balancing does not speak against all the larger realist paradigm in that neorealism also embodies Gilpin. But it is this very correctness that proves the larger point being made here and illustrates what so worried Lakatos about degenerating research programs. At the beginning of this article, four indicators of a degenerating research program were presented. Elman and Elman (1995) serves as evidence that all these are very much in play within the field. On the basis of their defense of neorealism and the review of the literature above, it will be shown that the protean nature of realism, promulgated by the proliferation of auxiliary hypotheses to explain away discrepant evidence, has produced an unwillingness to specify what evidence would in principle lead to a rejection of the paradigm. The result has been a continual theoretical articulation but in the context of a persistent dearth of strong empirical findings.

Using Gilpin and power transition in the manner of the Elmans is degenerating because permitting the paradigm to be supported by instances of either "balancing" or "not balancing" reduces greatly the probability of finding any discrepant evidence. As if this were not enough to cover all sides of the bet, Elman and Elman (1995, 187–8) maintain that, within the neorealist assumption of self-help, threat can be handled by bandwagoning, expansion, preventive war, balancing, hiding, and even what Schroeder has labeled "transcending."[15] In other words, there is always some behavior (in dealing with threat) that will prove realism correct, even though most versions will be shown to be incorrect, and even though neorealists "often consider balancing to be the most successful strategy for most states most of the time" (Elman and Elman 1995, 187). But if this caveat is the case, then why do states not regularly engage in this behavior? Elman and Elman rightly capture the theoretical robustness of the realist paradigm—showing that Waltz, Gilpin, and others are part of the paradigm—but they fail to realize the damning protean portrayal they give of its research program and how this very theoretical development makes it difficult for the paradigm to satisfy the criterion of falsifiability.

Instead, they conclude about Schroeder's (1994a) historical evidence that "no evidence could be more compatible with a neo-realist reading of international relations" (Elman and Elman 1995, 184). They conclude this because each of these strategies (bandwagoning, etc.) does not challenge the realist conception of a rational actor behaving in a situation of competition and opportunity. For them, so long as states choose strategies that are "consistent with their position in the global power structure and pursue policies that are likely to provide them with greater benefits than costs" (Elman and Elman 1995, 184), then this is seen as evidence supporting the broad realist approach. Only Wendt's (1992) claim that states could be "other-regarding" as opposed to "self-regarding" is seen as discrepant evidence (see also Elman 1996, Appendix, Diagram 1). Basically, these are "sucker bets" of the "I win, you lose" variety. Let it be noted that these are not bets that Elman and Elman are proposing; they are merely reporting what, in effect, the entire realist research program has been doing—from Walt, to Christensen and Snyder, to Schweller, and so forth. Collectively, the realist mainstream has set up a situation that provides a very narrow empirical base on which to falsify the paradigm.

What kinds of political actors would, for example, consciously pursue policies that are "likely to provide" them with greater costs than benefits? To see only "other-regarding" behavior as falsifying leaves a rather vast and variegated stream of behaviors as supportive of the paradigm. Schroeder (1995, 194) has a legitimate complaint when he says, in reply: "The Elman argument . . . appropriates every possible tenable position in IR theory and history for the neo-realist camp." He concludes: "Their whole case that history fits the neo-realist paradigm falls to the ground because they fail to see that it is their neo-realist assumptions, as they understand and use them, which simply put all state action in the state system into a neo-realist mold and neo-realist boxes, *by definition*" (Schroeder 1995, 194, emphasis in the original).

Instead of defending the paradigm, Elman and Elman (1995) expose the degenerating nature of its research program and the field's collective shirking of the evidence through proteanshifts. Many neotraditionalists, such as Mearsheimer (1990), have eschewed quantitative evidence challenging the adequacy of the realist paradigm; if realists will now refuse to accept historical evidence as well, then what kind of evidence will they accept as falsifying their theories? Only "other-regarding" behavior? That simply will not do.

The cause of this problem is the lack of rigor in the field in appraising theories. The nature of the problem can be seen in Elman and Elman's (1995) second point against Schroeder. Drawing upon Christensen and Snyder (1990), they note that balancing under multipolarity, for Waltz, is more difficult than balancing under bipolarity: "Thus Schroeder's finding that states failed to balance prior to World War I (pp. 122–3) and World War II (pp. 123–4) does not disconfirm Waltz's argument. . . . In short, a failure to balance is not a failure of balance of power theory if systemic conditions are likely to generate this sort of outcome in the first place" (Elman and Elman 1995, 190–1). This sets up a situation in which any failure to balance under multipolarity can be taken as confirmatory evidence because, according to Elman and Elman (1995, 90), "Waltz's theory also predicts balancing *failures*" (emphasis in the original). This again poses an "I win, you lose" bet. If the periods before World War I and World War II are not legitimate tests of Waltz's prediction of

[15] Transcending is seen by Schroeder (1994a) as particularly discrepant for realism, but Elman and Elman (1995, 188) view it as part of the realist approach.

balancing, then what would be? The implication is that balancing more easily occurs under bipolarity, but here external balancing is structurally impossible by definition. If this is the case, how is balancing a "law," or the main outcome of anarchy? This is especially problematic because there is a tendency in Waltz to see only the post-1945 period as a true bipolarity (see Nye 1988, 244), which means the rest of history is multipolar and subject to balancing failures.

In the end, Elman and Elman (1995, 192) concede that Waltz does believe that, "on aggregate," states should balance, so "Schroeder's evidence that states rarely balance does indeed pose a problem for Waltz's theory." They conclude, however, by citing Lakatos—only better theories can displace theories—and therefore Waltz's theory should not be discarded until something better comes along. They then outline a general strategy for improving the theory, namely, adding variables, identifying the domain to which it is applicable, and broadening definitions (especially of threat). All these, however, are precisely the tactics that have produced the degenerating situation the field now faces. Thus, they say, by broadening the definition of threat to include internal threats from domestic rivals, decision makers could still be seen as balancing, and bandwagoning "would not necessarily disconfirm the prediction that balancing is more common" (Elman and Elman 1995, 192). This would take the discrepant evidence of Levy and Barnett (1991, 1992) and of Larson (1991) and make it confirmatory. This is precisely the kind of strategy that Lakatos (1970, 117–9) decried.

What is also evident from this appraisal of the realist paradigm is that Lakatos's (1970, 119) comment that "there is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory" can play an important role in muting the implications of a degenerating research program, especially when alternative paradigms or competing mid-range theories are ignored, as has been the case in international relations. There have been too many empirical failures and anomalies, and theoretical emendations have taken on an entirely too ad hoc nonfalsifying character for adherents to say that the paradigm cannot be displaced until there is a clearly better theory available. Such a position makes collective inertia work to the advantage of the dominant paradigm and makes the field less rather than more rigorous.

If one wants to take the very cautious position that Schroeder's historical evidence affects only Waltz, one should not then be incautious and assume that other research programs within the realist paradigm are doing fine. A more consistent position would be to hold this conclusion in abeyance until all aspects of the paradigm are appraised. The lesson from Schroeder's (1994a and b) discrepant evidence should *not* be that his "article leaves the general neo-realist paradigm unscathed" (Elman and Elman 1995, 192), but that a major proposition of the paradigm has failed to pass an important historical test.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

It seems that the internal logic of the Lakatos rules requires that a warning flag on the degenerating direction of the research program on balancing be raised. Theorists should be aware of the pitfalls of setting up realist variants that produce a "heads, I win; tails, you lose" situation, which makes realism nonfalsifiable. In addition, greater efforts need to be made in specifying testable differences between realist and nonrealist explanations before the evidence is assessed, so as to limit the use of ex post facto argumentation that tries to explain away discrepant evidence.

If one accepts the general thrust of the analysis that the neotraditional research program on balancing has been degenerating, then the question that needs to be discussed further is the implications of this for the wider paradigm. Two obvious conclusions are possible. A narrow and more conservative conclusion would try to preserve as much of the dominant paradigm as possible in face of discrepant evidence. A broader and more radical conclusion would take failure in this one research program as consistent with the assessments of other studies and thus as an indicator of a deeper, broader problem. It is not really necessary that one conclusion rather than the other be taken by the entire field, since what is at stake here are the research bets individuals are willing to take with their own time and effort. In this light, it is only necessary to outline the implications of the two different conclusions.

The narrow conclusion is that Waltz's attempt to explain what he regards as the major behavioral regularity of international politics was premature because states simply do not engage in balancing with the kind of regularity that he assumes. It is the failure of neotraditional researchers and historians to establish clearly the empirical accuracy of Waltz's balancing proposition that so hurts his theory. If the logical connection between anarchy (as a systemic structure) and balancing is what Waltz claims it to be, and states do not engage in balancing, then this empirical anomaly must indicate some theoretical deficiency.

The neotraditional approach to date has muted the implications of the evidence by bringing to bear new concepts. The argument presented here is that such changes are primarily semantic and more clearly conform to what Lakatos calls degenerating theoryshifts than to progressive theoryshifts. If this is accepted, then at minimum one would draw the narrow conservative conclusion that the discrepant evidence (until further research demonstrates otherwise) is showing that states do not balance in the way Waltz assumes they do. Realists then can concentrate on other research programs within the paradigm without being susceptible (at least on the basis of this analysis) to the charge of engaging in a degenerating research program. Those who continue to mine realist inquiry, however, should pay more attention to the problem of degeneration in making theoretical reformulations of realism. Specifically, scholars making theoryshifts in realism should take care to ensure that these are not just proteanshifts.

The implication of the broader and more radical conclusion is to ask why a concept so long associated with realism should do so poorly and so misguide so many theorists. Could not its failure to pass neotraditional and historical "testing" (or investigation) be an indicator of the distorted view of world politics that the paradigm imposes on scholars? Such questions are reasonable to ask, especially in light of appraisals that have found other aspects of realism wanting (see Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995, Rosecrance and Stein 1993, Vasquez 1983), but they are not the same as logically compelling conclusions that can be derived from the analysis herein. It has been shown only that one major research program, which has commanded a great deal of interest, seems to be exhibiting a degenerating tendency.

Such a demonstration is important in its own right, particularly if analysts are unaware of the collective effect of their individual decisions. In addition, it shows that what admirers of the realist paradigm have often taken as theoretical fertility and a continuing ability to provide new insights is not that at all, but a degenerating process of reformulating itself in light of discrepant evidence.

Regardless of whether a narrow or broad conclusion is accepted, this analysis has shown that the field needs much more rigor in the interparadigm debate. Only by being more rigorous both in testing the dominant paradigm and in building a new one that can explain the growing body of counterevidence as well as produce new nonobvious findings of its own will progress be made.

REFERENCES

Banks, Michael. 1985. "The Inter-Paradigm Debate." In *A Handbook of Current Theory*, ed. Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom. London: Frances Pinter.

Boswell, Terry, and Mike Sweat. 1991. "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis of Systemic Dynamics, 1496–1967." *International Studies Quarterly* 35(June):123–49.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. "Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 25(December):541–68.

Claude, Inis L., Jr. 1962. *Power and International Relations*. New York: Random House.

Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack Snyder. 1990. "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity." *International Organization* 44(Spring):137–68.

Dehio, Ludwig. 1961. *The Precarious Balance*. New York: Vintage.

Doyle, Michael W. 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics." *American Political Science Review* 80(December):1151–69.

Elman, Colin. 1996. "Horses for Courses: Why *Not* Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *Security Studies* 6(Autumn):7–53.

Elman, Colin, and Miriam Fendius Elman. 1995. "History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look." *International Security* 20(Summer):182–93.

George, Jim. 1994. *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gulick, Edward V. 1955. *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*. New York: Norton.

Haas, Ernst B. 1953. "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" *World Politics* 5(April):442–77.

Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. 1990. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30(January):167–214.

Kegley, Charles W., Jr., ed. 1995. *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*. New York: St. Martin's.

Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond. 1994. *A Multipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: St. Martin's.

Keohane, Robert O. [1983] 1989. "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond." In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ada W. Finifter. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association. Reprinted in Robert O. Keohane. *International Institutions and State Power*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Keohane, Robert O. 1986. "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics." In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kissinger, Henry. 1994. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1978. *Defending the National Interests*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kuhn, Thomas S. [1962] 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kupchan, Charles. 1994. *The Vulnerability of Empire*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Lakatos, Imre. 1970. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." In *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lapid, Yosef. 1989. "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era." *International Studies Quarterly* 33(September):235–54.

Larson, Deborah Welch. 1991. "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?" In *Dominoes and Bandwagons*, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned, and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. 1995. *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Levy, Jack S. 1984. "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis." *International Studies Quarterly* 28(June):219–38.

Levy, Jack S. 1990/91. "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914." *International Security* 15(Winter):151–86.

Levy, Jack S., and Michael N. Barnett. 1991. "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–1973." *International Organization* 45(Summer):369–95.

Levy, Jack S., and Michael N. Barnett. 1992. "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14(December):19–40.

Masterman, Margaret. 1970. "The Nature of a Paradigm." In *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." *International Security* 15(Summer):5–56.

Morgenthau, Hans J. [1948] 1978. *Politics among Nations*. 5th rev. ed. New York: Knopf.

Niou, Emerson, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose. 1989. *The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1988. "Neorealism and Neoliberalism." *World Politics* 40(January):235–51.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1993. *Understanding International Conflicts*. New York: Harper Collins.

Olson, William C., and A. J. R. Groom. 1991. *International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation*. London: Harper Collins Academic.

Organski, A. F. K. 1958. *World Politics*. New York: Knopf.

Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Popper, Karl. 1959. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. London: Hutchinson.

Rosecrance, Richard. 1995. "Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict." *International Security* 19(Spring):145–63.

Rosecrance, Richard, and Chih-Cheng Lo. 1996. "Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic Interna-

tional System." *International Studies Quarterly* 40(December):479–500.

Rosecrance, Richard, and Arthur Stein, eds. 1993. *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Rosecrance, Richard, and Zara Steiner. 1993. "British Grand Strategy and the Origins of World War II." In *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Schroeder, Paul W. 1994a. "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory." *International Security* 19(Summer):108–48.

Schroeder, Paul W. 1994b. *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schroeder, Paul W. 1995. "History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look, The Author Replies." *International Security* 20(Summer):193–5.

Schweller, Randall L. 1992. "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" *World Politics* 44(January): 235–69.

Schweller, Randall L. 1994. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." *International Security* 19(Summer):72–107.

Simowitz, Roslyn, and Barry Price. 1990. "The Expected Utility Theory of Conflict: Measuring Theoretical Progress." *American Political Science Review* 84(June):439–60.

Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965." In *Peace, War and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Smith, Steve. 1995. "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory." In *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Snyder, Jack, and Robert Jervis, eds. 1993. *Coping with Complexity in the International System*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Spiezio, K. Edward. 1990. "British Hegemony and Major Power War, 1815–1935: An Empirical Test of Gilpin's Model of Hegemonic Governance." *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (June):165–81.

Strauss, Barry S. 1991. "Of Balances, Bandwagons, and Ancient Greeks." In *Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Thompson, William R., and Gary Zuk. 1986. "World Power and the Strategic Trap of Territorial Commitments." *International Studies Quarterly* 30(September):249–67.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War." *International Security* 9(Summer): 58–107.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1990/91. "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War." *International Security* 15(Winter):7–57.

Vasquez, John A. 1983. *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Vasquez, John A. 1992. "World Politics Theory." In *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan. London: Routledge.

Vasquez, John A. 1993. *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambrige University Press.

Vasquez, John A. 1995. "The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory after Enlightenment's Fall." In *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Vasquez, John A. 1996. "When Are Power Transitions Dangerous? An Appraisal and Reformulation of Power Transition Theory." In *Parity and War*, ed. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Vasquez, John A. N.d. *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Forthcoming.

Wagner, R. Harrison. 1986. "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power." *World Politics* 38(July):546–76.

Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Wayman, Frank W., and Paul F. Diehl, eds. 1994. *Reconstructing Realpolitik*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Wendt, Alex. 1992. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46(Spring):391–425.